The effects of technology on our humanity

Parameters, Summer, 2002 by D. Keith Shurtleff

"I am tired and sick of War. Its Glory is all moonshine. It is only
those who have never fired a shot nor heard the shrieks and groans
of the wounded who cry aloud for blood, more vengeance, more
desolation. War is Hell!"

William T. Sherman (1)

"..." and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their
spears into pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up sword against
nation, neither shall they learn war any more."

-- Isaiah 2:4

The "importance of PT," a reference to our physical training regimen, was all that defined the e-mail message I had just received from my boss, the commanding officer of an infantry battalion to which I had been assigned as Chaplain. There was no other text, but a video clip was attached. Opening the attachment, I saw what appeared to be an aerial view of an enemy bunker; the video obviously was from the nose cone of a quickly descending "smart bomb" (2) targeted on the bunker. Suddenly a door of the bunker opened and out ran a soldier, sprinting for all he was worth toward the edge of the screen. Just as he reached the far corner of the view, the screen went blank, indicating the bomb had hit the target. I watched the clip a few times, laughed at the commander's comment on PT, and forwarded the e-mail to some colleagues. Only later did some troublesome little questions start to nag at me: Did the soldier make it to safety? Were others caught unaware in the bunker? What human tragedies or sorrows, if any, fol lowed that blank screen?

This article will explore the increase of technology's influence in the military and the correlating effects that influence has on those who make war and those who fight in war. It will suggest the reason behind my finding humor in the video clip and my concurrent failure to consider from the start the human questions. That reason is subsumed in technology. In conclusion, the article will propose responses to the harmful influences of technology and explore their potential for countering or ameliorating those negative influences.

Devices and Disengagement

The concept of how technology can lead to disengagement may be most clearly delineated by Albert Borgmann's device paradigm. (3) While application of Borgmann's device paradigm to technology in a military setting is at first glance a strange prospect, it may be helpful in understanding how the most harmful aspect of technology, that of disengagement, comes about.

In Borgmann's paradigm, he uses the concept of the stove or hearth as compared to the furnace. (4) The hearth, according to Borgmann, was more than just a source of heat; though it was that, it also had a culture of its own. It possessed the characteristics of a "thing." These characteristics were embedded because the fireplace required engagement. (5) It informed and engaged the user as a furnace never could. The user of the fireplace was required to participate in its use. Chopping wood, keeping embers going, cleaning out old ashes--all were part of the experience. The hearth was also less efficient than a furnace, and so often families would gather there for evening activities. According to Borgmann, technology transforms "things" (the hearth) into "devices" (the furnace) by splitting means and ends. (6) In that transformation the means are provided by machines. The ends are split from the means and adopt the status of a commodity. The goal of technology in this splitting of means and ends is to make the c ommodity more available. As a result of this pushing of the importance of availability, devices take on important characteristics; they are safe, easy, instantaneous, and ubiquitous. (7)

Safe and Easy Warfare

Applying warfare to Borgmann's device paradigm provides some interesting insights. Often we hear soldiers crudely refer to the Army's mission as "to kill people and break things." While the true mission is much more involved than that description suggests, the description itself is helpful in applying the device paradigm. Basically, the focus of military technology has been to make the mission of killing people and breaking things easier and safer--the idea being that if someone is out to kill you and break your stuff, technology might be able to place you in a position to avoid their efforts, while enhancing your own efforts against them. As shown in other critiques of technology, the aim is efficiency.

A good example of this is in the development of the Javelin anti-tank weapon. Prior to the Javelin, the infantry's main weapon to destroy enemy tanks was the TOW missile, so named because it was Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, and Wire-guided. The problem with the system was that the firer had to keep the target in sight and guide the missile all the way to the target. The obvious danger was that the soldier had to stay in position until the target was engaged, or the weapon would be ineffective. The soldier firing the TOW could be detected and killed while he was waiting for the missile to hit. Enter technology. The replacement weapon, the Javelin, is what the soldiers term a "fire and forget" (8) weapon. The Javelin is a free-flying smart munition. It allows soldiers to point, shoot, and leave with assurance the target will be hit. This "machine" delivers on technology's promise. It is easy to use, and it increases the safety of the soldiers. Interestingly, it also disengages the soldier from the target.