Perspectives on the Korean War. . - Review Essay - book review

Parameters, Summer, 2002 by Donald W. Boose, Jr.

In retrospect, it is clear that the Korean War was a key history-shaping event of the 20th century. Beyond its obvious effects in Korea, the war resonated across the globe, recast the international structure of Northeast Asia, and impelled far-reaching changes in the American national security system. Although they were little recognized at the time, this war provided lessons on the organization and conduct of joint and multinational operations that still affect US military doctrine. The 50th anniversary of the conflict encouraged the publication of many new books. Three of these that focus on specific aspects of the war--the Chinese intervention, special operations, and US airpower strategy--are of particular value to Parameters readers. Two recent overviews of the war are also worth consideration.

In The Dragon Strikes: China and the Korean War: June-December 1950, Patrick C. Roe examines the Chinese intervention in the Korean War in October and November 1950. That intervention, which turned back an attempt by the United States and its allies to reunify Korea militarily and led to a stalemate and negotiated cease-fire, had far-reaching consequences. Roe, who was a Marine intelligence officer during the crucial battles, sets out to determine why the Chinese intervened when they did and why the US leadership so badly misjudged the Chinese intentions. He has used the most pertinent secondary literature, including recent work by China scholars, as well as archival and other sources, to produce a readable, thoughtful, and well-informed description of US and Chinese intelligence, strategy, planning, and operations during the crucial period. His focus is on what the Americans and Chinese knew, the decisions they made, and the military operations that resulted. He addresses tactical actions only when they are directly relevant to his story. Twelve maps provide just enough detail to allow the reader to follow the strategy, planning, and major force movements.

Roe concludes that the disaster was an American intelligence failure, the result of a grand deception by the Chinese who, after the first clash between United Nations Command (UNC) and Chinese forces in October 1950, had convinced the Americans that only a small number of Chinese were in Korea but a huge force was poised to cross the Yalu River from Manchuria. Based on this false assessment, General Douglas MacArthur opted to push on to the Yalu to secure the river crossing sites and present the Chinese with a fait accompli before the larger force could intervene. In fact, the Chinese had secretly deployed a 380,000-man army into Korea and had few forces left in Manchuria. Through their deception, they drew the American-led forces deep into North Korea in hopes of destroying them with an overwhelming attack.

Roe argues that to carry out this deception, the Chinese spread misinformation through bogus prisoners of war, diplomatic contact, the media, and misleading radio traffic. The plan's success depended on good information about US perceptions and planning. Roe suspects that Guy Burgess and Kim Philby, two turncoat British agents, passed much of this information to the Chinese through the Russians. Roe compares US national and theater-level intelligence estimates of the size of the Chinese force in Korea with battlefield information that, in sharp contrast, suggested the presence of a far larger number. He concludes that US leaders must have had other reports--persuasive but false--and deduces that the Chinese, knowing the United States was reading their communications, intentionally transmitted false information.

Whether or not one is persuaded by all of Roe's arguments (and he makes a very strong circumstantial case), The Dragon Strikes is a valuable, authoritative, and thought-provoking account of the strategic and operational aspects of the Chinese intervention that offers important lessons for senior military leaders in this "new" age of information warfare.

At the time the Chinese attacked, the 1st Marine Division, the US Army's 31st Regimental Combat Team (RCT 31), and supporting forces were deployed in northeast Korea at the Changjin Reservoir (the famous "Chosin" Reservoir, so called because of the Japanese name that appeared on US maps at the time). Beginning on 27 November 1950, elements of at least seven Chinese divisions attacked those units. Two battalions of RCT 31 were nearly destroyed east of the reservoir, but they delayed the Chinese long enough for the Marines to hold key terrain south of the reservoir and organize a fighting withdrawal that became one of the heroic episodes of US military history. Those who want more information on the "Chosin Campaign," can find it in the Chang/in Journal, an internet magazine edited by retired Army Colonel George A. Rasula, a veteran of RCT 31. Changjin Journal provides historical articles, historiographic analyses, first-person accounts, photographic essays, and book reviews. It is largely but not exclusively f ocused on the Army units that fought at the Reservoir.