The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security. . - book review

Parameters, Summer, 2002 by Phil M. Haun

The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security. By Grant T. Hammond. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001. 234 pages. $29.95. Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Phil M. Haun, USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

The turbulent career and controversial thinking of the late Colonel John Boyd, USAF, are lauded in this biography by Grant Hammond, a self-described Boyd disciple. His personal loyalty to Boyd, however, has prejudiced Hammond's judgment, resulting in a one-sided, exaggerated ode prone to hero-worship. Still, Boyd was undeniably an innovative thinker and had a significant influence on the defense community, and this work has real value if the reader can get past the recurrent David versus Goliath theme of Boyd single-handedly taking on and defeating the US Air Force. Moreover, since Boyd never published his ideas, Hammond has done a great service by recording Boyd's theory of strategic paralysis and maneuver warfare, focusing on a process known as the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) Loop.

The first half of the book is dedicated to the service career of John Boyd, the self-acclaimed maverick fighter pilot. Indeed, it was on combat missions during the Korean War that he had his grand epiphany. In a dogfight, the F-86's advantage over the MiG-15 lay in its ability to transition more quickly from one maneuver to another. This insight proved fundamental to Boyd's thinking. He went on to instruct at the Fighter Weapons School at Nellis Air Force Base and wrote the school's first aerial combat manual. His operational flying days at an end, Boyd went on to spend the next 20 years crusading for the procurement of more maneuverable fighter aircraft.

Arguably, Boyd's most significant contribution to fighter aviation was the development of the energy maneuverability diagram. This allowed for the first direct comparison of performance capabilities between aircraft and remains a useful tool for fighter pilots today. Boyd's obsession with maneuverability followed him to the Pentagon, where he worked on the initial development of requirements for the F-15. Unable to prevent the Air Force from designing a large, expensive, highly technical fighter, he jumped ship. He then formed the "Fighter Mafia" which, against the wishes of the Air Staff, successfully lobbied for the smaller, more maneuverable, less expensive F-16. Following his retirement in the mid- 1970s, Boyd continued his fight against waste, inefficiency, and the greed of the military procurement system by establishing the military reform movement. He also continued to provide insider information to Congress and the media.

The second half of the book addresses the autodidactic Boyd, a man dedicated to study and reflection, who then creates his magnum opus in the form of a 327-slide, 12-hour oration: "A Discourse on Winning and Losing." Presenting this briefing over 1,500 times, Boyd expands his thinking beyond the tactical decisionmaking of a fighter pilot who must transition from one maneuver to the next more quickly than his adversary. Boyd describes this thought process as the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) Loop and goes on to apply it to any encounter with a breathing, thinking opponent. The outcome is then determined by a series of decisions and actions. Boyd asserts that victory is achieved when one performs the OODA Loop faster than one's opponent, causing the adversary's system to collapse into confusion and disorder. Of the four steps of the OODA Loop, orientation proves to be the most critical. It consists of a combined process of analysis and synthesis based on cultural traditions, genetic heritage, previous experi ence, and new information.

To better illustrate his method of thinking, Boyd makes an example of the snowmobile, created from the handlebars of a bicycle, the outboard motor of a boat, the rubber tread from a toy bulldozer, and the skis from a downhill skier. Although constructed of parts designed for other purposes, the outcome was a vehicle perfectly suited for its conditions. Boyd the eclectic and inductive thinker likewise draws his ideas from a wide variety of disciplines, including biology, chemistry, mathematics, and military history. (For a complete copy of Boyd's reading list, see James G. Burton's Pentagon Wars, Appendix A.)

In keeping with the idea of the snowmobile, Boyd the theorist is best understood as a synthesizer of other theorists. He is most closely aligned with Sun Tzu, emphasizing deception, surprise, and shock in gaining victory. Boyd's deemphasis on technology finds him agreeing with Clausewitz over the persistence of uncertainty and friction in war, but parting ways in regard to the importance of direct attack on the enemy's main center of gravity. Instead, Boyd aligns himself with maneuver warfare proponents such as Guderian, Fuller, and Liddell-Hart, arguing that the focus of attack should be on multiple noncooperative centers of gravity. He defines these centers of gravity as "those vulnerable yet critical connections and activities that permit a larger system's center of gravity to exist." Strategic paralysis is thus achieved by a combination of cutting communication, disrupting movement, and enveloping the adversary's forces and resources.