Blowtorch: Robert Komer and the making of Vietnam pacification policy

Parameters, Autumn, 2005 by Frank L. Jones

Second, Komer understood the importance of authority and the use of power. His authorship of the National Security Action Memorandum establishing his position as special assistant fitted him with the whip necessary to drive interagency actors. His years of experience in government had taught him the written requisites for success. Johnson ceded to Komer the power that his special assistant needed to overcome the civilian agencies' resistance, and Komer wielded that power effectively.

Third, he had ensured direct access to the President. If Johnson did not select him to replace Bundy as the National Security Adviser, then Komer ensured that he would not have to act through Bundy's replacement, Walt Rostow. This single sentence in NSAM 343 guaranteed that he was an autonomous instrument of the chief executive and Commander-in-Chief. When he spoke or acted, he did so not as an underling of the National Security Adviser, but as the President's regent. As Porter remarked, Komer was recognized as "Lyndon Johnson's man." (60)

Fourth, over time, Komer created alliances with other senior officials who shared his vision. McNamara, whom Johnson revered during this period, was particularly instrumental in supporting his views, as was Rostow. Komer also divided and conquered when necessary, playing the Defense Department off the State Department. Another tactic he used was the anxiety and distrust between Johnson, who was determined to see his agenda implemented, and the State Department bureaucracy, which Johnson viewed as composed of an intellectual elite who resisted his objective. Komer bided his time, using McNamara to articulate his positions and Johnson's impatience to bring the civilian agencies to heel.

Last, and no less important, he understood the senior policymaker's psyche, his cognitive requirements, especially for information, and fulfilled them by his well-timed memoranda. Komer's reports served to reinforce Johnson's view that Komer was aggressively pursuing his agenda and was the "right man" for creating the Great Society overseas, an objective in which Johnson had a deep emotional investment. Historian Doris Kearns Goodwin recalled that Johnson called the Great Society "the other beautiful woman" and wanted this program to be more highly regarded than the New Deal. (61) Komer understood that this was true for the "other war" in Vietnam as well. He comprehended the significance of the picture of Franklin D. Roosevelt that hung over the fireplace in the Oval Office; FDR was the metric by which Johnson measured his political success and popularity as President.

Operational Achievements

From Komer's arrival in Vietnam in May 1967 through the end of the pacification program in February 1973, two leading authorities on this subject, Richard Hunt and Thomas Scoville, credit Komer, who left Vietnam in November 1968, and his successor, William Colby, later Director of Central Intelligence, with making CORDS largely successful on several levels. First, Komer integrated the organization effectively into the US Mission and Westmoreland's headquarters, thereby promoting healthy working relationships with Bunker and Westmoreland and helping CORDS not only survive later changes in military and political leadership but improving, as was necessary, US military-civilian coordination and programs under a single manager. Although the US military contributed the bulk of the personnel, funding, and resources, civilians held numerous policymaking positions as well as serving as field advisers, thereby improving cooperation between military and civilians. Second, the lines of communication between the CORDS staff and South Vietnamese government officials became particularly reliable, which was of considerable value in gradually improving South Vietnamese pacification planning and program development. Third, CORDS strengthened South Vietnamese programs which had languished, such as support to local militia and the war against the Viet Cong's politico-military infrastructure. CORDS, especially Komer, convinced the South Vietnamese government leadership to challenge the Viet Cong in contested areas after the Tet offensive. Fifth, the South Vietnamese pacification effort was centralized for better coordination, an initiative that began during Komer's tenure but reached fruition only under Colby. CORDS also pressured the South Vietnamese government to overhaul its top-level pacification management, which produced results. Sixth, CORDS had some influence on the South Vietnamese government to replace corrupt or ineffective officials, which Komer initiated. (62) Both Hunt and Scoville admit there is difficulty in measuring the effect on military operations. Nonetheless, pacification was emphasized in a number of military operations and gained limited priority among the military objectives specified in US-South Vietnamese campaign plans. (63)