Commentary & Reply - Saving Private Ryan - Sir Halford Mackinder - Letter to the Editor

Parameters, Winter, 2000 by Reed R. Bonadonna, William J. Prior, Michael P. Noonan

The term "geopolitics" has indeed taken on an unfortunate pejorative connotation in some circles, due to its association with the Nazis and then with the realpolitik of Henry Kissinger. However, I do not see how Mr. Noonan's categorization of geopolitical theorists would be helpful, for it merely clouds the debate. The key issue differentiating his two schools of thought is the approach to the balance of power, which of course is a matter open to many interpretations, depending on where one sits. Basically it seems to boil down to this: if a theorist is on your side, he is a "geostrategist"--if not, he is an "organic state thinker." One man's peaceful balance is another's dangerous imbalance that needs attention.

I am often fascinated by arguments decrying the "fallacy of technology." They always begin by admitting that technology is indeed changing international politics, but assert that there are some aspects that remain the same, as if the rest of us expected the entire system to change overnight. It seems we can all agree that the limitations of the physical world are becoming less imposing with the arrival of each new technological innovation. Technology is changing the world faster than the social sciences can adapt, and therein lies our problem.

I'm afraid Mr. Noonan and I will have to disagree on the potential for the kind of benevolent hegemonic leadership by the United States that he implies is an impossible pipe dream. Even realists like Ken Waltz and Christopher Layne have argued that successful aspects of successful states are imitated by others. As the most "successful" state in almost every category, the United States can expect that its behavior will be closely watched by other nations eager to replicate that success. The nature of American hegemony in the next century will go a long way in determining the actions of the other states and the nature of the system with which we will be faced. Other states may grumble at perceived American meddling and arrogance, but they do little to offset it--in fact, American leadership is welcome in most quarters. How precisely is the United States to use its unipolar position to change the world? The short answer is: lead, preferably by example.

The assertion that "geostrategic analysis is more useful than ever" in a world devoid of peer competitors and ideological conflict is intriguing but unsupportable. When there is no competition for territory, no obvious enemy to conquer or defend against, geostrategists must invent one, for geopolitical analysis is by its nature competitive. The identification of the importance of spatial considerations seems to always entail competition over that space. In the absence of great power rivalry, the map of the earth does not have to be the map of a battlefield--but it will be if we approach grand strategy from a geopolitical perspective.

Mr. Haggman begins his critique with the assertion that critical geopolitics is "anti-American," which seems to imply by extension that I was attempting to introduce some hidden anti-American agenda into Parameters. This is surprising, for surely Mr. Haggman knows that critical geopolitics (and all critical theory) may be many things, but one thing it is not is "anti-American." It is instead a terminological umbrella under which many different theories find a home, some of which are more "left-leaning" than others. Most, however, merely call for new investigations into the foundations of thought upon which our most basic ideas are constructed, trying to help us define and understand the true nature of the post-Cold War world and of politics itself.