Defending Taiwan - Commentary & Reply

Parameters, Winter, 2001

To the Editor:

In his article "What if ... 'China Attacks Taiwan!'" (Parameters, Autumn 2001), Richard Russell argues that our intelligence may underestimate the growing invasion capabilities of the PRC, misjudge Chinese invasion strategy, and overlook Chinese perception of a short window of opportunity, and hence internal pressures for an early attack. A decision to attack would not be telegraphed by the time-consuming massing of an invasion fleet. The Chinese are masters of deception and proponents of suspense. The first step would be a surprise missile and air assault designed to destroy Taiwan's ability to interdict invasion by sea and air, which could then follow swiftly. At some point in the future, and Russell suggests perhaps very soon, the PRC will be able to overwhelm Taiwan's defenses by sheer numbers by air, sea, and land, and by its demonstrated willingness to accept losses inconceivable to others. One must promote the best scenario, but prepare for the worst, which is the one Russell proposes. Hope is not a p olicy option.

The Chinese would not initiate an invasion if they thought that the United States could or would intervene in time to defeat it. Thus there is the additional question of American will. Some future President or Congress, if not the current ones, might not be prepared to accept the risks and costs involved in the defense of Taiwan. In Roy Howle's article in the same issue, "An Evitable War: Engaged Containment and the US-China Balance," he observes that "America's weakness lies not in her capabilities but with her national will." Credibility is at issue.

The fear that America either lacks credibility, or the ability to respond in time to a surprise attack, is all too plausible. It follows logically that if Taiwan is to be able to deter an attack, much less to defeat one, it must have more than a defensive capability. It must be able to impose unacceptable risks and losses on the PRC bureaucracy and military. This means more than sinking ships and destroying coastal cities on the Taiwan Strait. It means the ability to strike at the heart of PRC power and control: "enough" strategic nuclear missiles on submarines roaming the seas, beyond the reach of the PRC military, protecting Taiwan from surprise attack and the United States from agonizing indecision. The United States could assist in Taiwan's procurement or production-no more than China has been doing for assorted paranoid regimes. If Russell's analysis is correct, it should be done now.

Charles T. Stewart, Jr.

Emeritus Professor of Economics

George Washington University

Washington, D.C.

The Author Replies:

Professor Stewart correctly points out that Chinese perception of US intentions, resolve, and military capabilities to respond quickly to a Chinese military assault against Taiwan is a critical factor in the cross-Strait stability equation. His point that American policymakers need to address these hard issues sooner, rather than later, is well-taken.

I do, however, have serious reservations about Professor Stewart's recommendation that the United States assist Taiwan in developing nuclear deterrent capabilities. As a general observation, I am skeptical of the arguments that nuclear deterrence is inherently easy and that the proliferation of nuclear weapons enhances international security. American efforts to help Taiwan develop a nuclear deterrent posture would render our efforts elsewhere to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as hypocritical and undermine their overall effectiveness. More specifically, American assistance to a Taiwanese nuclear weapons program would surely be seen as "crossing a red line" and as a direct threat by Beijing, substantially adding to the Chinese incentive to militarily move against Taiwan. The Chinese would need to preempt Taiwan before it could make nuclear forces operational.

The Taiwan Strait poses a stubborn dilemma for American policymakers. How are they to walk that fine line between efforts to bolster deterrence and reduce the prospects for a Chinese assault against Taiwan while stopping short of efforts that could precipitate a conflict? I strongly suspect that Professor Stewart's policy prescription for assisting Taiwan nuclear weapon capabilities would cause the American tightrope walker to lose balance and fall.

Richard L. Russell