The effects of Korean unification on the US military presence in Northeast Asia

Parameters, Winter, 2002 by Carl B. Haselden, Jr.

While the United States has explored various options to minimize Marine presence on the island, a workable long-term solution has not been developed. The Marine Corps is conducting more training off of Okinawa in other Asian countries, and QDR 2001 tasked the Secretary of the Navy to develop new concepts of training in littoral warfare in the western Pacific. In the future, the Marines maybe able to retain bases on the island by reducing their size from a Marine Expeditionary Force to a Marine Expeditionary Brigade. However, redeploying the Marines to Hawaii, Guam, or the continental United States without a technological break-through in fast-speed sealift would add days and even weeks to their ability to respond. The long-term solution may be, as General Jones describes, "lily pads in the Pacific," where the US military has arrangements with a number of countries to train on their territory for short periods of time and then depart. (57)

In Sum

Korean reunification--if it indeed comes about--will change the US military presence in Northeast Asia, and the United States should begin laying the groundwork to ensure that this historic event increases regional opportunities and not challenges. A continued US presence in both the Republic of Korea and Japan would provide unique capabilities and an ability to respond to regional contingencies. Such a continued presence would serve as a stabilizing factor during any period of transition. US forces remain in a unified Germany today for similar reasons, even though the Soviet Union is no longer around to threaten European security.

The decision on whether or not the United States retains bases in the ROK and Japan is ultimately up to each of those governments. If the decision is made by either to remove US bases, there is likely to be increased domestic pressure on the other nation to do the same. Neither wants to be the only nation in Asia allowing foreign forces on its soil.

The island of Guam, due to its small size and distance from the key areas in Asia, cannot make up for the loss of bases in the ROK and Japan. While the United States should strive to maintain its essential bases in Northeast Asia, it should also seek to hedge its position through technological offsets. The QDR 2001 direction to the Secretary of the Navy to develop new concepts of maritime prepositioning, high-speed lift, and new amphibious capabilities suggests ways the United States can maintain an expeditionary presence without having to depend on nations to grant access. The US services, especially the Air Force, should also develop a longer-range, high-speed strike aircraft which will further reduce dependence on land bases.

Finally, the evolving US force presence will operate in a complex multinational and interagency environment. In order to defeat the transnational threats to security in the region, the US military must be capable of coordinating and operating with US embassies and various national and international intelligence agencies, law enforcement personnel, medical facilities, and economic institutions just as easily as it operates within a joint environment today. A small, capable, and expeditionary joint force will be seen as a complementary capability to the Japanese and Korean militaries and will less likely be construed as a threat by the Chinese.