Keeping special operations forces "special"

Parameters, Winter, 2004 by James E. Hayes, III, John Gordon, Jerry Sollinger

To the Editor:

I would like to commend Lieutenant Colonel John Gordon IV and Colonel Jerry Sollinger on their insightful analysis of the Army's future path ("The Army's Dilemma," Summer 2004). They identify low- to mid-intensity combat as the focal point for Army operations, an assertion that is certainly panning out in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and elsewhere. However, I take issue with the authors' ideas concerning the expansion of special operations forces (SOF). They voice ah opinion that is unfortunately shared by many serving and aspiring policymakers--that is, we must produce more SOF to win the war on terrorism. This "if some are good, more must be better" attitude belies a misunderstanding of SOF's assessment/selection methods and operational ethos.

Put simply, special operations forces cannot be mass-produced like conventional forces. The reason why Army Special Forces, Navy SEALs, Air Force Special Tactics, and other SOF are so good is because the community is very selective about the type of individual it brings into these organizations. For example, the Army's grueling Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) has a historical attrition rate that hovers around 70 percent--with another 10-15 percent lost in the ensuing Special Forces Qualification Course. This is not attrition for attrition's sake; in fact, Special Forces candidates are not harassed, hazed, or otherwise coerced into quitting at any time. Rather, the physical and mental rigors of the training cull out those who do not possess the necessary attributes for service in SOF. The end result is a soldier who is tough, self-reliant, innovative, and flexible. We have witnessed the true value of this process in recent operations around the world SOF has proven to be a decisive element and the force of choice in our struggle against terrorism.

Any rapid expansion of SOF would almost certainly undermine this proven selection and training process. The SOF community would be forced to cut corners and lower standards in order to produce more special operators. The results would be a degraded operational capability and, tragically, a greater probability of mission failure and lost lives. And while we might garner a certain sense of satisfaction with more Special Forces teams and SEAL platoons on the books, it would be a hollow one at best.

Major James E. Hayes III, Special Forces

School of Advanced Military Studies

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

The Authors Reply:

Major Hayes points out that special operations forces cannot be expanded rapidly and that any attempt to do so would undermine their quality. We concur. Special forces are just that--special--and quality will always trump quantity. Nothing we said in our article should be taken to mean that the Army should expand the output rapidly. However, we do believe it is possible to expand the structure without eroding the quality. A measured approach that pays careful attention to ensure standards remain high can increase the structure. We also would note, as General Peter Schoomaker did in his 29 July 2003 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, that conventional forces can be trained to do many of the things that special operations forces (SOF) do, which would free the latter to do more of the things that only they can do. This step could have the same effect as increasing SOF structure. Given the time required to produce high-quality SOF forces (as Major Hayes correctly pointed out) the Army should start the process of expanding its SOF capabilities as soon as possible.

John Gordon and Jerry Sollinger