Strategic realignment: ends, ways, and means in Iraq

Parameters, Winter, 2007 by Bruce J. Reider

Four years into the war in Iraq, the debate rages over whether there are enough troops deployed to accomplish the mission. Congress and the White House continuously argue over resources and the conduct of the war. Meanwhile, American and Iraqi casualties persist at an unacceptable rate. America's political and military leaders suggest progress is being made and we should stay the course; after all, it generally requires eight to ten years to defeat an insurgency. From a historical perspective, they are correct. But the situation in Iraq is not just an insurgency, and labeling it as such is a gross oversimplification of the challenges we face.

Iraq is a mega-complex challenge; a collage of complex issues that cannot be readily deconstructed into individual issues and problems, solved, and put back together. Every issue in Iraq has potential second- and third-order effects as well as unintended consequences. Some of the enduring factors that will not be easily resolved are the deep-rooted religious conflict, modernization, corruption, inequitable distribution of wealth, lack of economic development, discontent among young males, the prevalence of militias, and a divided government influenced by sectarian interests. Understanding these issues is essential to comprehending the overall nature of the war.

Complicating the situation is the presence of terrorists. Allegedly, in an interview with Jordanian journalist Fouad Hussein, the late terrorist Abu Musab al Zarqawi outlined al Qaeda in Iraq's steps toward world domination and establishment of a caliphate. Al Qaeda has a three-stage strategy in Iraq: to expel American forces, establish an Islamic authority or emirate in Iraq, and extend the jihad to the secular countries neighboring Iraq. (1)

The current situation in Iraq is the result of three fundamental strategic mistakes. First, the United States, particularly its military, initially was remiss in discerning the nature of the conflict and subsequently failed to reassess the situation as circumstances evolved. Second, the government, as a whole, failed to balance ends, ways, and means. Third, the government chose the wrong strategy. Instead of adopting a strategy appropriate for the complexities of a multifaceted conflict that includes elements of civil war, insurgency, and terrorism, decisionmakers instituted a strategy predominantly focused on counterinsurgency operations. Not only have decisionmakers failed to recognize the realities of the situation, they have failed to adapt and anticipate.

Policy by Other Means

It is important to keep in mind that war is a political act. According to Clausewitz, "War is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means." (2) The wisdom of the decision to invade Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime is irrelevant. (3) The fact of the matter is the United States is fully engaged in Iraq and needs to remain committed to resolving the challenges it was a party to creating. Although unilateral withdrawal is an option, it would further destabilize the entire region or, worse, lead to the implosion of Iraq, plunging the entire Middle East into war. Retired General Barry R. McCaffrey assesses that such a conflict "would be a disaster for 25 years." (4) Iraq is essential to regional and global stability, and "victory in Iraq is a vital national interest." (5)

The Nature of the Conflict

Accurate determination of the nature of a conflict is the critical first step in understanding the actions required for success. Clausewitz's insight reveals, "The nature of war is complex and changeable ... its nature influences its purpose and its means." (6) The appropriate strategic solution to any conflict depends on correctly assessing its nature. Iraq is, however, a unique conflict. On the one-hand, it resembles a civil war; on the other, it looks like an insurgency.

In November 2005, the National Security Council published the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, a comprehensive approach for defeating the then two-and-a-half-year-old insurgency. The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq articulated an integrated counterinsurgency strategy designed along three broad tracks--political, security, and economic--consisting of eight strategic objectives (pillars) and 46 subordinate objectives or lines of action. The military was primarily responsible for defining the nature of the war in Iraq as an insurgency and implementing the associated strategy focused on counterinsurgency operations (COIN).

Although the nature of the 1959-1975 conflict in Vietnam is different from that in Iraq, there are strategic similarities. In his classic book on the conflict in Vietnam, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, the late Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., described how the United States failed to correctly determine the nature of the conflict and consequently pursued a flawed strategy. According to Colonel Summers, "Counterinsurgency became not so much the Army's doctrine as the Army's dogma ... and stultified military strategic thinking for the next decade.... Counterinsurgency took on a life of its own.... The March 1962 issue of Army [magazine] ... was devoted to (in its own words) 'spreading the gospel' of counterinsurgency." (7)