Strategic realignment: ends, ways, and means in Iraq

Parameters, Winter, 2007 by Bruce J. Reider

Means

Thus far, the political debate has focused almost exclusively on means; specifically, does the United States have enough manpower in Iraq to accomplish the mission? Clausewitz advises, "The degree of force that must be used against the enemy depends on the scale of political demands on either side.... To discover how much of our resources must be mobilized for war, we must first examine our own political aim and that of the enemy." (13) There is a growing segment of the American public that is losing its patience, however, given the apparent lack of political progress. Even Congress, despite limited political grandstanding, has not shirked from providing the means to prosecute the conflict. Steadfastly, the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and the American military have insisted that any troop reductions must be "conditions-based." That position makes sense; however, demonstrating progress toward an acceptable end-state is a reasonable expectation if we are to retain the political will of Congress and support of the American people.

What number of military forces is needed in Iraq? In his article "Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations," James T. Quinlivan offers some planning figures for calculating security requirements. According to Quinlivan, "Peaceful populations require force ratios of somewhere between one and four peace officers per thousand residents. The United States as a whole has about 2.3 sworn police officers per thousand residents. Larger cities tend to have higher ratios of police to population." (14) But these figures are for routine policing against crime and general population security in a relatively stable environment. "For cases drastic enough to warrant outside intervention, the required force ratio is normally much higher. Successful strategies for population security and control have required force ratios as large as 20 security personnel (military and police combined) per thousand residents." (15) Although the British used a force ratio of approximately 20 security personnel per 1,000 inhabitants during the Malaysian counterinsurgency, there simply are no definitive planning factors for COIN operations.

The population in Iraq was approximately 25.5 million in 2002. Based on a planning factor of 20 security personnel for every 1,000 inhabitants, Iraq requires 510,758 security personnel. The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq calls for a security environment of 326,000 Iraqi military and police. In comparison, the US Department of State projected in the period between September 2004 and January 2005 it would require 271,000 Iraqi troops and police to "neutralize insurgents and maintain domestic order." In contrast, the Coalition Provisional Authority Strategic Plan of 2003-2004 envisioned a permissive security environment of 162,000 Iraqi troops and police when the security objective was to "defeat terrorists/Ba'athists and provide a secure environment." (16)

In its "Iraq Weekly Status Report" dated 25 July 2007, the Department of State reported there were approximately 354,100 trained and equipped Iraqi Security Forces comprised of 194,200 Ministry of Interior forces (police, national police, and other ministry forces) and 158,900 Ministry of Defense forces (Army, Air Force, and Navy). These numbers do not include an estimated 144,000 Facilities Protection Service personnel. (17) According to a Congressional Research Service report dated 15 July 2007 there are approximately 156,250 US troops in Iraq. (18) The combined sum of Iraqi Security Forces and US military forces in Iraq exceeds 510,000, not taking into account other Coalition forces. (19)