Strategic realignment: ends, ways, and means in Iraq

Parameters, Winter, 2007 by Bruce J. Reider

The Iraq Study Group Report listed four possible courses of action in Iraq: precipitous withdrawal, staying the course, more forces, and devolution to three regions. (33) Alternatively, the United States and its allies could adopt one of three different strategies in an effort to end the civil war. The first strategy of withdrawal would be a political and moral mistake. This will likely result in widespread bloodshed among the civilian population. The United States has a moral responsibility to stay and support the Iraqi people. Politically, withdrawal from Iraq would cost America credibility in the region. From a security perspective, withdrawal would create an unacceptable void leading to greater instability. The second strategy is ceasefire and separation that may initially require an even greater influx of forces. This strategy would involve a multinational approach preferably under United Nations auspices (Chapter 6 or Chapter 7 of the UN Charter). This solution could provide for a secure and stable environment conducive for the negotiation of long-term, permanent solutions to issues such as federalism, oil revenue sharing, the status of Kirkuk, and the establishment of a transparent and inclusive government. The third strategy is to choose a side. The immense moral and political effects of this strategy render it infeasible, unacceptable, and unsuitable. Therefore, ceasefire and separation would appear to be the best strategy for achieving desired political ends.

Logic dictates that a political problem requires a political solution. War is, after all, politics by other means. The situation in Iraq depends on political discourse between all parties; the United States, its Coalition partners, the Iraqi government, and the various opposition factions. The solution cannot rely exclusively on military action. Interestingly, the Iraq Study Group agreed with the goal of US policy in Iraq but concluded, "Current US policy is not working." (34)

The US government needs to address a number of strategic omissions if progress is to be made toward resolving the conflict. First, America and its military need to understand the nature of the war, i.e., a conflict dominated by sectarian violence, entailing a low-level civil war, a Sunni insurgency against Coalition forces, and the limited actions of al Qaeda terrorists bent on spreading global jihad. Second, we need to balance ends, ways, and means. Changes in the desired political end-state may become necessary. In a monograph published by the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, W. Andrew Terrill suggests, "If a civil war can be avoided for the time being by deemphasizing rapid democratic development, then this sacrifice will need to be made." (35) In terms of means, there currently are sufficient forces in Iraq; at least through the end of March 2008. Ways equates to how the means are used--the strategy. This is the third change that is necessary. The strategy needs to fit the nature of the war. A change of strategy is required to address the spectrum of threats, not just the aspects related to the insurgency. In fact, efforts need to focus on the most dangerous threat, a sectarian-based civil war.