Strategic realignment: ends, ways, and means in Iraq

Parameters, Winter, 2007 by Bruce J. Reider

One of the first steps in changing strategy will be to negotiate a ceasefire between the various factions and agree upon the terms of compliance. The diplomatic emphasis needs to shift from its focus on building capacity in the government to brokering a ceasefire and ending the violence, while empowering Shia, Sunni, and Kurd factions to negotiate their own political solution. Sunni inclusion will be the litmus test for a successful political solution. The economic instrument of national power can be a powerful incentive and should be used accordingly. Initiatives such as micro-loans, debt forgiveness, direct loans, and other economic programs can provide the proverbial carrot to entice the various factions to negotiate a ceasefire and maintain compliance.

The security focus needs to be on Baghdad. Baghdad has a diverse population of approximately six million and has historically been the center of gravity culturally, politically, and economically. Military forces should be used to establish and control a zone of separation (ZOS) between factions in and around the city. Boundaries of the ZOS must be clearly delineated and marked. Any ceasefire agreement needs to include provisions for establishing a commission consisting of representatives of the various factions, along with Coalition forces, in an effort to resolve conflicts and mediate disputes. Implementation forces responsible for verification and enforcement of the terms of the ceasefire would be designated and positioned on key and decisive terrain ensuring freedom of movement, maintaining visibility, and helping to build a feeling of security for the population in an effort to create an environment capable of supporting a separation of forces and a return to peace. Patrols should be used to confirm or deny factional compliance. Show of force may be used if necessary. Collectively, these measures provide the best approach for establishing and maintaining peace and stability while political processes work toward permanent solutions.

Conclusion

The will of the American people and Congress is waning. The United States cannot afford to withdraw from Iraq, but changes are necessary. First, we need to acknowledge the true nature of the war. The situation has grown from what might initially have been an insurgency to a multifaceted conflict that includes all the elements of civil war, insurgency, and terrorism. Second, there is a requirement to reexamine the ends, ways, and means to ensure that a political end-state is achievable with the means the United States is willing to expend, and the ways we, as a nation, support. Success will be exceedingly difficult to achieve unless ends, ways, and means are balanced. This may require redefining the ends from the ideal to a more realistic goal. In terms of means, the United States currently has sufficient forces in Iraq. Ways--the strategy--is the other variable and the third change that is necessary. The United States needs to develop a strategy focused primarily on minimizing civil unrest and resolving the sectarian-based civil war. The first order of business against which all instruments of national power should be oriented is obtaining and enforcing a ceasefire agreement between the warring factions, accompanied by the political discourse leading to permanent solutions for the daily problems facing Iraqis. Although this may seem like an overly simplistic approach it presents the only potential for achieving the end-state that would permit US and Coalition forces to withdraw in meaningful numbers.