Doctrine corner

Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, Jan-March, 2003 by Chester F. Brown, III

As this issue of MIPB is read and passed among the members of your unit, so too will the draft versions of the two newest Military Intelligence (MI) field manuals: FM 2-0, Intelligence, and FM 2-01, Intelligence Synchronization. These manuals combined with FM 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, form the first iteration of MI manuals being revised to take into account the Operational Environment (OE). FM 2-0 supersedes FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare; FM 2-01 supersedes both FM 34-2, Collection Management and Synchronization Planning and FM 34-2-1, Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance.

These manuals reflect only one facet of the MI Corps' effort to more closely align MI doctrine with Army operational (combined arms) doctrine. Revising Ml doctrine is part of a larger Army effort to implement positive changes based upon lessons learned in combat; observations from Combat Training Center (CTC) exercises; CTC intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) trends reversal issues; and use of operational terms instead of MI specific--stove piped--terms. This article addresses the changes to the manuals identified above.

FM 2.0, Intelligence. The three most fundamental changes in FM 2-0 (FM 34-1) are changing the title, replacing the Intelligence Cycle with the Intelligence Process, and instituting the new intelligence tasks. The new title, Intelligence, mirrors that of FM 3-0, Operations. This title is not only simpler but also more accurate. The former title of the MI capstone manual led one to incorrectly surmise that Ml does only two things: intelligence and electronic warfare (EW). However, these two functions are distinctly separate. MI and EW are essentially mutually supporting actions in that you cannot perform all-source intelligence without EW and you are unable to perform effective EW without accurate intelligence. EW is more properly placed in its role of supporting operations in general and targeting specifically. By dropping EW from the manual's title, we also underscore that EW is a function--not the reason for the existence of the MI Corps.

A more complex change replaces the Intelligence Cycle with the Intelligence Process. At first reading, one may consider this change to be one of semantics--mirroring the titles of the Operations Process, the Targeting Process, and the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). However, the change goes beyond merely substituting words. It more accurately reflects the continuous and inherently flexible nature of a process versus the sequential method presented in a cyclical model. Let us examine how we present this information in FM 2-0.

The first two steps of the Intelligence Process and the Operations Process remain the same--Plan and Prepare. We have broken down the third step of the Operations Process-Execute--into the separate steps of Collect, Process, and Produce within the Intelligence Process. Essentially, these are the actions MI systems and soldiers perform during mission execution. The fourth component of the Operations Process-Assess--is presented as a continuous function. This is also how it is presented in the Intelligence Process; however, we add two more components that are performed continuously: Analyze and Disseminate.

We recognize there is an inherent danger in interpreting the Intelligence Process as a sequential methodology, such as the MDMP. We are however, striving to avoid this pitfall by explaining the Intelligence Process in FM 2-0.

Before attempting to understand the Intelligence Process, one must first understand the Operations Process. The Intelligence and Operations Processes are not only complementary but also cannot function effectively without the other. While Figure 1 attempts to show the strong relationship between the Intelligence and Operations Processes, it is important to note that the gear representing the intelligence process is smaller than that representing the Operations Process. This portrays the frequently encountered situation where the Intelligence Process runs through several iterations before the Operations Process completes a single iteration. This is particularly true during the Plan and Execute phases of the Operations Process. It is during these phases that the Intelligence Process may be completed hundreds, sometimes even thousands, of times for each completion of the Operations Process.

The next major doctrinal change presented in FM 2-0 is the subordination of the Intelligence Tasks described in FM 3-0 under the Intelligence Tasks listed in the FM 7-15, Army Universal Task List (AUTL). This subordination is intended to avoid the past confusion that resulted in soldiers referring to the tasks as outlined in several documents (the AUTL, FM 2-0, FM 3-0, or the Ml core competencies). Figure 2 shows how we presented the Intelligence Tasks in FM 2-0.

As you can see, we have retained the current Intelligence Tasks identified in FM 3-0 within the AUTL tasks. While some intelligence tasks apply to more than one AUTL task, AUTL procedures limit us to subordinate each task under only one AUTL task.