Distributed Common Ground System-Army: focused on the future

Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, Jan-March, 2004 by Alfred Burkhard

With the recent approval by the Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC), the Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) continues its march to the Milestone B decision in the third quarter fiscal year 2004 (FY04) and, ultimately, fielding as the Army's capstone intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) processing system. Critical to the success of DCGS-A are the joint interoperability requirements mandated in the Department of Defense (DOD) Distributed Common Ground/Surface System (DCGS) Capstone Requirements Document (CRD). In order to ensure compliance with these requirements, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) G2 participates in the ongoing Integrated Process Team (IPT) process within DOD through the Army Intelligence Master Plan (AIMP) program.

DCGS-A

As the capstone ISR processing system for use by the Future Force, DCGS-A will provide access to information and intelligence collected by national, joint, other Services, coalition, and Army intelligence as well as non-intelligence sensors and systems. It is imperative that the Army identifies joint, interagency, and multinational (JIM) interoperability issues for both current systems and those planned for the future. This interoperability is not restricted to just intelligence systems; battle command, signals, fires, mobility, sustainment, and medical systems are also part of the discussion and planning. To be "expeditionary" demands a lighter, more lethal, scalable, and modular force with immediate access to information and intelligence that precludes the "stovepiped" systems in existence today. The Unit of Action (UA)--the combat force that will execute decisive operations in the Future Force--must have access, without latency, to information and intelligence regardless of the source or location of the collector that allows the commander to make fully informed decisions faster than his adversary.

The operational view shown in Figure 1 captures both the complexity and the essence of the environment in which DCGS-A will provide support to the warfighter. As depicted in the figure, the UA is the centerpiece of the combat organization ultimately charged with conducting decisive operations. It will have the ability to draw from multiple sources for various layers of both information and intelligence that will enable the UA commander to make timely decisions. No longer encumbered by stovepiped systems, but enhanced by interoperability and connectivity across the spectrum, the UA commander will be able to access information and intelligence regardless of the original source. This will not, however, be possible without a significant investment in a process that will vet such critical aspects as the--

* Various multilevel security policies.

* Intelligence domain-specific nuances.

* Force structure concerns.

* Personnel training issues.

* Assured communications.

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

Within the Army alone, the entire Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership, Materiel, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTLMPF) process requires addressing and examination as it pertains to the Future Force with a specific focus on intelligence.

Three Integrated Process Teams

The IPTs provide the venue with which to explore the issues of JIM The IPTs formed to address the specific intelligence domain, as well as common issues and challenges. For example, during October 2003, the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT), and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and Geospatial Information IPTs held meetings and addressed a number of these issues in joint interoperability.

The most recent SIGINT meeting included an update on horizontal fusion efforts; the discussion included the Joint National Tactical SIGINT Software to eliminate selected duplicative SIGINT software and tools among the Services and the National Security Agency (NSA). Additionally, the Services addressed issues that had joint and other Service impact. For example, the Air Force discussed the impact of software upgrades on the U-2 Dragon Lady and the ability of the other Services to receive U-2 collected data.

MASINT and IMINT subject matter experts (SMEs) attended the 8 October 2003 MASINT IPT. This wide-ranging meeting touched on a number of topics and areas of concern. Among other issues, it included an announcement that the Air Force has designated the Distributed Common Ground System-Air Force (DCGS-AF) as a weapon system. By virtue of this declaration, the other Services must adhere to specific rules and policies that will affect adjustments necessary to assure interoperability. Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) MASINT message traffic will use a new U.S. Message Traffic Format (USMTF), the tactical MASINT report (TACMASINTREP) format. Additionally, the multidiscipline intelligence correlation of the MASINT electronic intelligence (ELINT) and ground moving target indicator (GMTI) effort has now received funding; the Joint Expeditionary Fires Experiment (JEFX) in the July-August 2004 time frame will demonstrate and test it.