An open-source overview of the technical intelligence collection threat in Asia

Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, April-June, 2004 by Wade C. Wilson

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center. the Departments of the Army and Defense, and the U.S. Government.

The technical intelligence (TECHINT) threat to government employees and civilian travelers in Asia is as prevalent today as was TECHINT targeting of Western embassies and diplomats in Moscow at the height of the Cold War. Even this comparison may be below the mark because indeed both Russia and certain areas of Asia today have far surpassed the level of targeting that one once expected between the polar antagonists of the Cold War era.

The reason for this increase in threat is not because of increased political tensions but rather for a more pragmatic reason--money, or more specifically, economic espionage. Indeed, the nature of the threat is at the heart of the reason why open sources can adequately identify the threat. During the Cold War, only very rare exposes, such as the "Great Seal" attack at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow--graphically presented by the U.S. Ambassador as evidence at a publicly televised United Nations forum--or the Soviet bugging of the then new U.S. Embassy in the 1980s, ever made it to the national press. Most other incidents were only for the purview of those with access to the classified newsreels; the rest of the world remained blissfully ignorant of the technical threat they might be facing during overseas travel.

Background

Beginning in the 1980s, the transformation of the world's political and economic environment changed the nature of the threat. Certainly, the threat was present as far back as the Korean War when Japanese technicians began reverse-engineering U.S. aircraft parked on their tarmacs in between sorties over Korea. (1) Such rumors as Air France having bugged its first-class seats with microphones to overhear conversations between international business executives and reports of laptops and documents copied or even stolen at French hotels give credence to this new age threat. Suddenly, the threat was neither from the United States' traditional "enemies" nor focused on politico-military targets, allowing an open, honest examination and discussion of what this threat meant for the future of U.S. security. This short overview will sift through some of the available open-source data to uncover the technical intelligence threat facing everyone (business executive, government official, or tourist) who happens to find a trip to Asia on their upcoming itineraries.

First, one should note that the technical threat is not universally focused, prevalent, nor equivalent throughout Asia. Certain countries have a more dedicated collection program than others, either for reasons of economic espionage or political security. An open-source list of these countries (in alphabetical order) includes Japan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), the People's Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), the Russian Federation, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. This is not to say that technical collection does not occur in other countries of Asia, perhaps notably India and Pakistan. In fact, technical collection probably does occur in every country that maintains an intelligence service worldwide; however, either they do not direct the focus toward foreigners not deemed a domestic security threat, or the information available on the threat is not widely available in an open-source forum.

TECHINT Collection Equipment

Indeed, the equipment needed to conduct most basic technical collection missions (microphones, cameras, and receivers) is widely available in the commercial market at prices that even amateur hobbyists could afford and thereby conduct collection missions in almost any environment. Additionally, for those hobbyists who do not have the technical nor engineering background to build their own hidden transmitters and receivers, various Japanese and Taiwanese electronics companies produce ready-made products such as video cameras and microphone transmitters inside devices that one can install or temporarily transport into areas of interest. (2) These devices may appear to be smoke detectors, notebooks, alarm clocks, telephone outlets, calculators, cellular telephones, or even a pack of cigarettes. This goes to show that even if a country does not appear, at the outset, to have an ongoing technical collection mission, any country could conduct technical collection at will by simply surging the capability using a small commercial-off-the-shelf purchase and detailing a team of intelligence professionals or engineers to emplace and monitor the equipment on the target of interest. Such targets of interest might include international conferences or negotiations where collectors might monitor delegation members to determine their nation's hidden negotiating platforms. Similarly, they often monitor international companies' contract bidding process, thereby allowing local competitors to underbid them by the smallest of increments. Truly, any area that might be of national interest (economic well being is assuredly part-and-parcel of the Asian national interest) is a valid target for technical collection.