The MI-Signal "Rock Drill" for the Initial Brigade Combat Team

Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, July, 2000 by Colonel William A., Jerry L. Schlabach

The mark of the post-Cold War era has been a variety of threats, a variety of locations, a variety of situations (cultural, political, et cetera), and unpredictability as to what we're going to face. Therefore, we must have the organization and people who can handle these future missions of unknown types. The challenge of this organization (the Initial Brigade Combat Team) is to have leaders and soldiers who can solve problems that they don't know in advance.

Major General James M. Dubik,

Fort Huachuca, Arizona,

23 March 2000.

From 20 to 24 March of this year, more than 100 subject matter experts (SMEs) and VIPs convened at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, to conduct the MI-Signal "Rock Drill" for the Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). The IBCT is a fundamentally new Army organization that will serve as the basic building block for the transformation of the entire Army. This successful analytic event is already enabling U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to understand much better the issues associated with developing and fielding the first IBCT next year at Fort Lewis, Washington. Used in conjunction with other analytic events this year, this experience will enable the Army to better appreciate the design implications of the new force, and to deploy a top quality organization capable of responding to 21st century threats.

What is the Initial Brigade Combat Team?

The organization and operations (O&O) document for the IBCT describes the fundamental concepts used in the design of the IBCT. This document guides TRADOC planners and analysts as they develop new tables of organization and equipment (TOEs); training courses; doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); and even new equipment for the IBCT. The first version of the O&O, published in December 1999, explains how the design of the new force is such a significant departure from the design of traditional Army units.

For example, the IBCT can rapidly respond to crises in timelines more normally associated with light brigades. A small-scale contingency (SSC) environment is a mixture of a stability and support-type operation and a major theater war (MTW). Traditional light forces can respond to an SSC within 96 hours, but lack the firepower necessary to deal with the threat of a conventional attack inherent in SSC missions. Traditional heavy units retain the requisite firepower, but their force structure does not readily lend itself to SSC-type force projection operations during crises. The IBCT will be capable of responding to a midlevel SSC challenge in a timely manner with an adequate amount of firepower and expertise. This will enable the IBCT to stabilize the crisis into a classic stability and support operations mission, or to defend itself upon escalation to an MTW.

One of the striking new features of the IBCT is its dependence upon intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, to include intelligence "reach back" to sanctuary units and organizations. According to Lieutenant General William M. Steele, the commander of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, "this organization is unique in that it will spend more time looking for the enemy than fighting the enemy." Major General James M. Dubik, the Army Transformation

Force Commander at Fort Lewis, Washington, stated:

One of the things we're trying to do with this [IBCT] O&O is move from the current paradigm of "make contact with the enemy and then maneuver the force," to "understand the situation, maneuver the force, and make contact at our place and time of choosing." ISR is a key element in that shift. We can't make the shift unless we get the ISR part right.

To respond to this new information and intelligence challenge, the IBCT enjoys an extraordinary (by traditional standards) amount of ISR assets. The brigade will possess an organic Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron, as well as an independent MI Company. The RSTA Squadron is different from a traditional cavalry unit in that the RSTA unit will not conduct combat operations (e.g., screen, guard, or cover) unless augmented. The RSTA Squadron will employ a highly capable set of organic assets, to include--

* Three RSTA Troops containing 27 RSTA squads on 27 squad vehicles. This is enough to conduct simultaneous reconnaissance of a telling 18 named areas of interest (NAIs), according to the U.S. Army Armor Center, the proponent for the design of the RSTA squadron.

* A human intelligence(HUMINT) trained soldier in each of those 27 squads to conduct "tactical questioning" and to support "multidimensional reconnaissance operations."

* A Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) Platoon in a separate Surveillance Troop. This unit's four TUAVs can provide the brigade commander 12 hours of coverage per day.

* A Ground Sensor Platoon, also in the Surveillance Troop This platoon will possess Prophet ground SIGINT (signals intelligence) systems, as well as ground surveillance radar (GSR) and Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System II (REMBASS II) systems.