From the editor - information operations - Editorial

Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, July-Sept, 2003 by Del E. Stewart

Information operations (IO), and intelligence support to IO, are simultaneously frustrating and intriguing. This "new" field of warfare fascinates many. A word of caution is advisable.

... there is no new thing under the sun.--Ecclesiastes 1:9

Indeed, if one considers the various forms and types of IO, one can easily make the case that various forms of IO have been around for more than 2,500 years. Need proof?

Therefore there are five kinds of spies used: local spies, internal spies, double spies, doomed spies, and living spies.... For doomed spies we use agents to spread misinformation to the enemy.... This is essential for warfare, and what the army depends on to move [emphasis added].--Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 13, The Use of Spies

Information is a weapon and a force multiplier. This crystal clear understanding of the nature of information is the primary underpinning to all of our current security regulations; that is, to protect friendly information. Likewise, this understanding is precisely what drives our need to collect information about our adversaries; establish priority intelligence requirements; conduct the art and science of intelligence synchronization; engage intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance systems; and so forth. That IO now extends to the World Wide Web, and includes "cyberwarfare," assessment of adversary and neutral media sources, etc., does not make it a new principle of war. It is merely that with these new applications, we are in the process of considering IO aspect of war in new ways, with new implications and ramifications.

When considering carefully the contributions contained in this issues of MIPB, it is vital to return to the basic definitions of terms. Some of these appear below:

Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) are questions by adversary officials and intelligence systems are likely to ask about specific friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities so they can obtain answers critical to their operational effectiveness. [JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms]

IO are actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems (INFOSYS) while defending one's own information and information systems. [JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations]

IO are continuous military operations within the military information environment that enable, enhance, and protect the friendly force's ability to collect, process, and act [up]on information to achieve an advantage across the full range of military operations; [IO] include interacting with the global information environment and exploiting or denying an adversary's information and decision capabilities. [Draft FM 3-13, Information Operations]

Information Security is the protection and defense of information and INFOSYS against unauthorized access or modification of information whether in storage, processing, or transit, and against denial of services to authorized users. INFOSEC includes those measures necessary to detect, document, and counter such threats. Information security comprises computer security and communications security. [JP 3-13]

Operations Security. OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to a) Identify those actions observable by adversary intelligence systems, b) Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain with which they could interpret or piece together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries. c) Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. [JP 3-13]

Although the intuitive understanding of IO is solid, actually codifying the principles; doctrine; and tactics, techniques and procedures of IO in modern venues--across the full spectrum of operations--is a daunting task. First, there is the matter of proponency: Since IO cuts across all echelons tactical through national, affects all services, and is both offensive and defensive in nature, who "owns" it? "Ownership" means responsibility for training, leaders development, personnel management, and a host of other issues. Again, reach exceeds grasp. It is one thing to be aware of the issues, another to solve them.

Many of the articles in this issue of MIPB should provoke thought, and are not meant as a definitive statement of where the Army is heading; rather, these are the insights and suggestions from readers like you who feel they have an idea they should contribute for public debate. We thank you for your efforts in this vital and multifaceted debate.