Information operations in support of demonstrations and shows of force

Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, July-Sept, 2003 by Arthur N. Tulak

A version of this article by then Major Tulak previously appeared in the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Training Techniques, 2nd Quarter, Fiscal Year 2003 (TQ2-03) at http://call.army.mil/products/trngqtr/tq2-99/showforc.htm. Reprinted with permission.

The U.S. Army conducts shows of force and demonstration operations to influence key decisionmakers and audiences to support U.S. objectives. Information operations (IO) leverage the effectiveness of these operations across the pillars of IO by informing targeted audiences of friendly force capabilities and intent. Shows of force and demonstrations are military operations conducted by combat forces to protect U.S. and allied interests, give warning and pause to hostile groups, persuade neutrals, and encourage friendly groups. (1) Shows of force and demonstrations are military activities that support preventive diplomacy, (2) one of the three diplomatic-led activities of peace operations in which military activities play a supporting role. (3)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) conducting peace operations in the former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) conducted a show of force 25 March to 17 April 1998 to demonstrate SFOR's rapid reinforcement capability. Military activities appropriate for shows of force and demonstrations in support of peacekeeping and peace enforcement include multinational training exercises demonstrating coalition military capabilities, interoperability, unity of effort, and resolve. (4)

The show of force exercise, dubbed Dynamic Response (DR) '98, commenced with an amphibious landing at Ploce on the Croatian coastline on 26 March 1998. (5) The culmination exercise of DR '98 was a combined arms live-fire exercise (CALFEX) demonstration called Dynamic Strike '98, held at the Glamoc firing range in Multinational Division-Southwest (MND-SW). Both the show of force and its concluding demonstration were intended to show to the people of FRY and their military and political decisionmakers the SFOR's ability to insert additional combat forces into the theater rapidly to reinforce SFOR.

As SFOR reduced its on-the-ground force structure in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the requirement for a reliable rapid-response capability took on increased importance. SFOR needed to retain the capability of responding to a renewal of hostilities or increased tensions in order to maintain the peace imposed upon the former warring factions (FWFs) during the initial peace-enforcement operations conducted in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. The creation of a European-based Strategic Reaction Force (SRF) for the Bosnia arena allowed SFOR to continue on-the-ground force reductions without compromising its credibility to enforce the military provisions of the Dayton Peace Accord through lethal combat power. This force, while not based in theater, had the mission of serving as both a deterrent to renewing hostilities and a viable reinforcement option to support one or more SFOR sectors in a period of heightened tension. The purpose of the show of force and demonstration was both to demonstrate visibly that despite reductions of on-the-ground forces, SFOR still had the capability to respond to escalation and remained committed to enforcing the peace, and to train the SRF to execute tasks associated with rapidly reinforcing a deployed peace-operations force.

IO provide the U.S. Government with the capability to influence the perceptions and decisionmaking of the FWFs while improving the deterrent value of power-projection options. (6) Political concerns dominate shows of force and demonstrations, as the objective is to dissuade adversaries from interfering with the enforcement of international law, United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs), and internationally recognized peace accords. (7) At the operational level, IO employed in conjunction with shows of force and demonstrations supports deterrence of the resumption of hostilities and reassures allies and the international community that the peace-operations force remains capable of implementing the peace agreement. In peace-enforcement operations, maintaining security involves demonstrations of inherent military capability and preparedness, and the overt presence of uncommitted mobile combat power in the form of a reserve. (8)

SFOR leveraged the deterrent effects of DR '98 by incorporating IO with the lethal combat power components into a fluid exercise that was extremely successful in showing its resolve in maintaining unbroken enforcement of the Dayton Peace Accord. Used in this manner, IO can enhance the impact of informational, diplomatic, economic, and military efforts, and forestall or eliminate the need to employ forces in a combat or crisis situation. (9) Demonstrations and shows of force, supported by effective information operations, can deter adversaries from interfering with the peace-operations force or its objectives or from resuming the hostilities with the other FWFs. (10) The objective is to demonstrate resolve and commitment to a peaceful resolution while underlying the readiness and ability to use force if required. (11)