Deconstructing the theory of 4th generation warfare

Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, Oct-Dec, 2004 by Del Stewart

The promulgators of the theory of fourth generation warfare, Greg Wilcox and Gary I. Wilson, state the following:

"First generation warfare was reflective of tactics and technology in the time of the smoothbore musket and Napoleon. The tactics were of line, column, and mass armies. According to the authors, vestiges of the first generation of warfare exist today in the desire for linearity and rigid adherence to drill and ceremonies. The battle lines at Gettysburg are reminiscent of first generation warfare with straight lines and mass charges into the mouths of cannons.

"It is significant that those civilizations that did not adhere to this generational change in warfare were quickly subdued, and in many cases colonized. European states took advantage of this newer form of warfare to subdue much larger countries, such as India.

"Second generation warfare ... was in response to the technological improvements in firepower and communications, particularly the railroad. It was based on fire and movement, but the essence was still attrition warfare, i.e., heavy applications firepower ...Tactically, World War I, as practiced by the French and British, and Vietnam, as practiced by the Americans, were second generation warfare.

"Third generation warfare was also seen as a response to the increasing firepower on the battlefield. The difference, however, was the emphasis on maneuver and non-linear warfare. In other words, in addition to the improved technology, the third generation of warfare was based more on ideas rather than the technology. The German Blitzkrieg and later Russian operations in World War II were seen as breakthrough strategies to defeat the more heavily armed industrialized armies of the world.

"From these characterizations, the authors posed the hypothesis of fourth generation warfare. This style of warfare was based on the trends identified in the earlier generational shifts. They believe that future war would be characterized by: very small independent action forces (SIAF) or cells acting on mission-type orders; a decreased dependence on logistics support; more emphasis on maneuver, and psychological goals rather than physical ones. This latter objective of psychological warfare meant that the enemy's will to fight had to collapse from within." (1)

Also, fourth generation warfare (4GW) includes three basic constructs:

[] The loss of the nation-states' monopoly on war.

[] A return to a world of cultures and states in conflict.

[] Internal segmentation or division along ethnic, religious, and special interest lines within our own society. (2)

Deconstruction

We have defined what 4GW is according to its proponents. This article will now critically examine these claims.

First, to start the generational construct of warfare in the Napoleonic era implies that all that preceded Napoleon Bonaparte is so irrelevant as to not even merit discussion. No true student of history, let alone military history, would advocate ignoring the advances in the conduct of war and theory of war established by Sun Tzu, Joshua of Israel, Alexander the Great, Gaius Julius Caesar, Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus, George Washington, etc. As a minimum, one should, at least, reconsider the start-point.

Second, proponents of 4GW admit two key issues. First, although generational advances may occur, they are not uniformly dispersed nor adopted. Second, ideas can be sufficient, of themselves, to warrant a generational paradigm shift. This article discusses more on that later; let us first examine the three basic constructs of 4GW.

The loss of the nation-states' monopoly on war. Of itself, this is a misleading construct. Tribes, peoples, clans, and nations (without states) have never relinquished their ability to wage war. The mere advent of the nation-state did not uniformly negate the existence of other conflict and forms. The fact that this nation fought the French and Indian wars, allying with some tribes while engaging others in battle, while simultaneously allying with our mother state (England) while fighting the French, is of itself proof that nations, tribes, clans, and peoples have never relinquished their willingness, nor their ability, to wage non-state war. The existence of mercenaries is another point--these are non-state actors. The existence of pirates, such as the Islamic Barbary Coast pirates fought during the era of Jefferson, is yet another instance of non-state actors engaging organized states. (3) Nation-states never held such a monopoly on war, and therefore could never lose the alleged monopoly.

A return to a world of cultures and states in conflict. This statement implies that there once was a world without cultures and states in conflict. Even using the argument promulgated by the 4GW theorists and starting only with the Napoleonic era, there is no time for a supposed "golden era" where cultures and states were not in conflict. Since the proponents of 4GW are American, yet use European examples, we will consider the relatively recent history of Europe and the United States from the time of Napoleon Bonaparte to the present (see Figure 1). So there was never a time when cultures and states were not in conflict.