Situational Awareness [Lucky or Good?]

Flying Safety, Oct, 2001 by Pete Wilkie

It was 0300 hours local PSAB time as our two-ship was pushing into southern Iraq for another Southern Watch night sortie. I was a young, mission-ready F016 pilot flying with an experienced instructor pilot. My assigned radar search volume limited me to keeping track of lead only with my FLIR and air-to-air TACN. I misprioritized my attention and soon realized I had lost situational awareness (SA) of lead's position...evident by the increasing DME. My next action was to admit loss of SA. I called out "blind."

Sound familiar? Or what about the airman who is chastising ATC as he is sent around the pattern, only to realize he has had a "hot mike" all the while? Have you ever lost SA, or realized that your SA had been "down the tubes" all along? Why do the more experienced pilots tend to have better SA? What's their secret? Are they lucky, or are they "just that good"?

SA is like the white buffalo. We can all recognize SA when we see it, but mystery still surrounds what it actually is. AFI 11-290, Cockpit and Crew Resource Management Training Program, defines situational awareness as the "continuous perception of self and aircraft in relation to the dynamic environment of flight, threats, and mission, and the ability to forecast, then execute tasks based upon that perception. "For me, a simpler definition is. "SA is knowing what's going on around you."

Dr. Mica Endsley (expert on human factors and situational awareness and president of SA Technologies in Marietta GA) defines situational awareness using three cognitive levels. Level one is Perceiving. At this level, you are reacting to what is happening around you ("behind the jet"). Level two is comprehending. At this level, you under stand what is going on and the are able to understand events ("with the jet") Level three is Projecting. At this level, you are able to be proactive ("ahead of the jet")

A way of thinking about these levels is by using an emergency procedure (EP) example. If the EP is new or unfamiliar, then I'm reacting to events well after they unfold and after I've had time to analyze them (Level One). If I have basic knowledge of an EP, then I'm able to react almost immediately to events as they occur (Level Two). If I have experienced the EP before and have a full understanding of the EP and its implications, then I'm able to anticipate the events before they unfold (Level Three).

Comfort level in the cockpit likely increases as the levels increase. But "comfort" can be beneficial or detrimental. "Comfort" allows you to perform flying routines automatically (beneficial). "Comfort" also allows you to fly into the ground in a relaxed state when your SA is relatively low (detrimental). Loss of SA occurs when one of the interlocking levels (see diagram) does not reflect what is really happening.

So what's the big deal about losing SA? According to Mr. Perry Nelson, an egress specialist from Brooks AFB, "The most frequent cause of a delayed ejection (or no attempt to eject) is the loss of situational awareness" ("Egress Systems: What's New," Flying Safety, Oct 00). You see the world as you see it, not as it is. A false perception can rapidly lead to death when you're traveling at the speed of stink.

Internal and external factors can lead to the loss of SA. Internal factors may include personal issues spilling over into flight, channelized attention, complacency, task saturation, lack of job knowledge, lack of flying currency and personality conflicts, just to mention a few. Some external factors affecting SA include poor communication, unexpected events, automation error, adverse weather and system errors. How can we combat these SA "dumpers"?

I think of SA in three closely related parts: flight awareness, system awareness and environment awareness. The first two parts we have control over. The last part we have little control over; we mostly react.

The most familiar part of these concepts is "flight awareness." Flight awareness deals with the interaction of people. It applies to the interaction between flight members, regardless of whether they are in the same aircraft or one of the wingmen in spread formation. Are these people acting the way they were briefed and IAW the expected norm? Do the comments made conyey an accurate "picture"? Are the comments useful and timely? Does the pacing of tasks match up with what is "standard" or briefed? Are tasks executed correctly? Flight awareness becomes obvious as events unfold through actions and radio transmissions.

"System awareness" may be defined as simply knowing what your aircraft's instruments and systems are telling you and how it relates to the mission. Publications are the foundation of system awareness. These provide ops limits and general flight rules, among other information. The ability to correctly process systems information defines the pilot's system awareness.

The last part of the SA picture is "environment awareness." This part includes all of the uncontrollable factors, such as target area weather and enemy formations or actions. I can increase my environment awareness by planning for these factors with predetermined options (i.e., weather backup attacks), but I can't directly control them. The ability (or inability) to react rapidly becomes apparent during this part of a mission.