Trainers

Flying Safety, Jan-Feb, 2002 by Major Mike Folkerts

Aug 01 Midair Collision. This sortie involved a two-ship formation mission to the area, with a solo student in the Lead position. During fighting wing naneuvers, the student in the dual aircraft flew to a position at the right 3 to 4 o'clock position of lead, from which he attempted to lag to maintain position. The combination of this lag maneuver to the left and lead's entry into a right hand barrel roll maneuver put the flight into a situation where lead was in the sun. The IP asked his student if he had lead in sight, to which he replied that he did. Uncertain that the student could correctly assess angle-off and closure, the IP took control of the aircraft and initiated a negative-G maneuver. Simultaneously with this maneuver, both IP and student testified they saw a shadow off to the right and high, followed immediately by the collision. Although the dual crew was able to successfully eject, the solo student pilot was fatally injured.

The IP did not anticipate the sequence of maneuvers, which placed the solo lead in the sun and allowed an uncomfortable situation to mature. He took the aircraft and initiated corrective action too late. Barrel rolls with lead in the sun are a bad combination, especially when entered from a poor aspect angle. Instructors recognize that one of the toughest jobs they have is deciding how far to let a student go. For new IPs especially, like the one in this mishap, never be afraid to keep your student on a short leash.

Flameouts/Compressor Stalls. T-38 aviators know the J85 has always been touchy when operated near the edge of its operating envelope. This fact was evident in the majority of last year's Class E incidents. The impact of JP-8 on the operating envelope has raised concerns from the field. At the time of this article's publication, the systems program office at Hill AFB is conducting an evaluation to determine if the change to JP-8 has altered the operating envelope. Regardless of the outcome of this evaluation, making judicious throttle movements when near the edge of the envelope and paying attention to critical factors like OAT may help reduce the rate of unintentional single-engine operations.

T-1 Jayhawk

Flying over 94,000 hours, the T-1 experienced another stellar year in FY01. There were no Class A mishaps last year, which continues a streak started back in 1992 at Reese AFB, TX. The only other USAF aircraft produced in significant numbers (not counting the "one-or-twoeach" UV-18, etc.) that can make this "no Class As" claim is the C-20. All personnel involved in T-1A flying are justified in being proud of their accomplishments, but at the same time should guard against complacency.

For FY01, there were two Class B mishaps and four Class C mishaps. Of these six mishaps, five involved engine system issues. Thirty-two Class F and High Accident Potential (HAPs) incidents were reported, with the majority of these involving either smoke/fumes in the cockpit or flight control malfunctions. Keep in mind that the difference between a Class F or HAP and a Class A mishap, for the aircrew, is often only a matter of seconds or feet. For Maintainers, this difference can be a few millimeters or a few foot-pounds. Later in this article, you'll find logistics measures taken in response to the flight control incidents.