Ops topics

Flying Safety, March, 2002

Editor's Note: The following accounts are from actual mishaps. They have been screened to prevent the release of privileged information.

Death and Destruction In A Parallel Universe

You'll soon be able to read the annual HATR (Hazardous Air Traffic Report) round-up in the pages of Flying Safety magazine. Until then, and in the interest of risk management--and potentially saving your bacon!--we bid you pay attention to the following HATR-worthy events.

HATR-Worthy Event Number One

The strat airlifter was fragged for an early departure in support of a Distinguished Visitor (DV) mission at an unfamiliar airfield. Maintenance problems the morning of the mission forced a tail number swap to a different aircraft and, to facilitate an on-time departure, the aircraft commander (AC) did flight planning while the rest of the crew preflighted the new aircraft. The AC finished mission planning and arrived just a few minutes before scheduled departure time, surmising an on-time takeoff was still possible with just a little extra hustle.

Engine start was uneventful and the crew started running the Before Takeoff checklist as the aircraft taxied or takeoff. A flight control problem cropped up during taxi, but the AC elected to work it while on the go. The crew was so intent on working the flight control troubles--focused overly much on an on-time takeoff and getting the DVs to their destination on time, maybe?--that none of the crewmembers realized their airlifter had taxied past the runway "Hold Short" line. The airlifter's nose was now protruding into the active, just as another heavy was landing. Fortunately, the airfield's Ground Controller was able to establish communication with the crew and directed the airlifter to expedite the active immediately. Which it did. In a parallel universe, however, the two aircraft did collide on the runway killing all aboard, including the nearly four dozen DVs.

HATR-Worthy Event Number Two

More perceived mission press involving DVs... The flight of two aircraft was scheduled to transport a flag officer from one forward operating location to another. After repeated unsuccessful attempts to establish contact with Tower to request taxi permission to pick up the DV at Base Ops, flight lead transmitted on Tower's frequency that he was taxiing and, then, after picking up the DV, made another radio announcement that the flight was departing the airfield.

In a parallel universe, the flight taking off had a midair collision with a flight of two arriving aircraft, which resulted in the deaths of all crewmembers and several innocents on the ground from falling debris and fire. Since this event didn't take place in that parallel universe, all involved lived to fly another day with neither loss of life nor aircraft.

So what set the stage for potential disaster here? Seems that ATC services were normally very good at this forward operating location (FOL). However, operating at a location little better than a bare-base, full-service support with "all the trimmings" wasn't always available at the FOL. In this case, some unexplained communication problems and scheduled Tower radio maintenance conspired to create a situation where Tower was incommunicado with some flight-ready aircraft during a crucial time.

Granted, ATC procedures for ensuring positive control of aircraft movements in situations where radios were down--not to mention, scheduling radio maintenance when there was no aircraft activity--needed some definite tightening up. But put yourself in this aircrew's situation: Does taxiing and taking off without Tower coordination--and clearance--sound like an acceptable, non-standard procedure to you? Sure hope not...

HATR-Worthy Event Number Three

Conditions were day VFR with light winds (four knots) reported variable from the East. A USAF heavy was positioned on Runway 08 awaiting takeoff clearance. Tower advised USAF heavy they'd be issued takeoff clearance once a commercial heavy landed on the crossing runway, Runway 04.

Soon after the commercial heavy landed, Tower cleared USAF heavy and it began takeoff roll. USAF heavy's flight crew had computed [V.sub.R] to be 136 knots, but perceived their aircraft trying to get airborne at 105 knots. Then they perceived it settling on the runway. Then lifting off again. Then settling again. One more liftoff and one more settle. During this eternity of seconds--actually, only about 5-10 seconds--the pilot flying the aircraft applied and maintained flight control pressure, doing his best to keep it on the ground until [V.sub.R]. The aircraft stabilized passing through 112 knots and the flight crew was able to proceed with a normal takeoff and rotation at computed [V.sub.R]. Once USAF heavy was safely flying and its crewmembers started breathing again, they decided filing a HATR was definitely warranted.

And the major contributor to the thrilling takeoff experienced by this USAF heavy crew? Gold star if you guessed wake turbulence from the just-landed commercial heavy. Regulatory publications contain the following information on wake turbulence: