A bad day for a dirty-up

Flying Safety, May, 2003 by Chris Saufley

We had been in Japan for about a week or so, and were just getting used to flying in the local area around MCAS Iwakuni. Our Prowler squadron was supposed to be aboard the IJSS Constellation (CV-64) bound for a traditional WesPac cruise. However, the day prior to embarking aboard "Connie" we were ordered to Iwakuni, Japan.

Conducting flight operations from Iwakuni was new to the entire squadron. We were conditioned to flying around the boat and not a foreign airfield. In true Naval Aviation fashion we managed to quickly adapt to the local course rules and standard operating procedures and focused our operations on unit-level training and FCLPs. A week into the detachment our crew was scheduled for a division low-level with an FCLP period at the backend of the sortie. It was primed to be a fun hop, with some good low-level training and ball-flying in prep for the boat. There aren't many better ways to finish up a hop. However, it turned out that the low-level was obscured by a low cloud deck, necessitating a flight at the top of the route structure in prevailing VMC. As we popped off the route and began heading back towards Iwakuni, our crew began to focus on the upcoming FCLP evolution.

We were "Dash 3" in the formation approaching the break at Iwakuni from the south. This is a particularly challenging approach because it restricts aircraft to a minimum amount of straightaway prior to the approach end. Lead barely had enough time to level the flight for the break after the required dogleg pattern entry. As our jet broke and decelerated through Prowler gear speed of 250 KIAS, my pilot lowered the gear, flaps and slats. As the EA-6B has notoriously poor handling characteristics below 250 KIAS without the slats and flaps extended, it is SOP that during landings and takeoffs the backseaters will visually monitor the slats downward progress. Today was no different, with the notable exception that I noticed out of the corner of my eye that something wasn't right. My "spidey senses" started tingling. Although the slats were coming down, they were coming down too slowly. The EA-6B's slow flight characteristics with flaps down and slats up is even more troublesome than if nothing had extended, with a dramatic pitch-up and departure from controlled flight within 5-10 KIAS of anticipated normal approach speed. As the aircraft continued to decelerate I immediately called over the ICS "stuck slats." Nearly simultaneously, my pilot and ECMO 1 stated "barber-poled slats." The pilot immediately applied full power and accelerated the aircraft to a safe airspeed. Approaching the abeam position we coordinated a climb to 2500 feet in order to fully evaluate the situation.

With a good indication on the flaps, we suspected an electrical or mechanical failure in the slat drive. Repeated attempts to raise or lower the slats were unsuccessful, leaving the aircraft in an unfamiliar. flaps down/slats partially extended configuration. With no reference to this configuration in NATOPS, we opted to fly the most conservative approach speed that came close to matching our predicament. A quick climb to 5000 feet AGL provided a safe margin to evaluate this configuration on approach. A precautionary short field arrested landing was coordinated with tower and we set up for an approach to the southern runway. Tower briefed the wind as from the south at six knots. The southern approach still required a sharp dogleg turn to final, which became the focus of attention for all members of the crew. The pilot carried some extra energy through the turn and was controlled to an uneventful rolling engagement by our own squadron Landing Signal Officer.

We felt relieved to be safely on deck but immediately began to wonder if we had handled the situation in the best manner. In retrospect we did, given our unique configuration problem. The lesson learned from this hop was that NATOPS doesn't cover every possible situation. The best way to prepare yourself is to know your jet inside and out, and think outside the NATOPS box for "what if" situations. You should be flexible in these situations and apply common sense to uncommon situations. In addition, you should always think things through to landing. In hindsight, we could have foregone the dogleg to final by accepting a 6-knot tailwind to an arrested landing on the opposite runway. It would have offered the lesser of the two threats.