Decisions, Decisions

Flying Safety, June, 2001 by Paul Jennings

It wasn't any big deal, really. But when it was over, I was amazed at how many decisions my crew and I were faced with in handling a routine malfunction during a routine Operation Southern Watch (OSW) flight. I thought it worthwhile to jot them down so that you, the "armchair quarterback," could look at our experience and decide, (1) "What a bunch of idiots," or (2) "What amazing American heroes."

The squadron was two weeks into its 90-day deployment, flying out of lovely Prince Sultan Airbase (PSAB), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with the USAF's 363d Air Expeditionary Wing. The turnover had gone well with the outgoing Prowler squadron and we were quickly settling into the OSW routine. My crew and I were on our fourth flight into "The Box," Iraq's Southern no-fly zone. With about 15 minutes left to cover in the vulnerability window, I noticed the left combined hydraulic pump reading almost zero PSI.

Decision 1 was easy: Turn south now. As we proceeded to the Saudi/Iraqi border, we contacted the AWACS, told them our problem and asked for weather at the primary divert field. Al Jaber in Kuwait. AWACS reported it as two miles visibility, with blowing dust. During our two short weeks in the desert, we'd all gained a healthy respect for how quickly a 120-degree bright and sunny day could go to 1/4-mile visibility on the deck due to blowing dust--sort of a "chocolate milk" bowl effect.

Decision 2 reared its ugly head: Where do we land? Al Jaber was only about 60 NM away, and we had 6000 pounds of gas. Easy to make that, but what about that weather? PSAB was calling sky clear with visibility unlimited, but it was about 45 minutes away, and a fight with the KC-135 stood between us and PSAB. We were now at the border and entering the tanker tracks. We'd completed the checklist for loss of a single hydraulic pump; no real guidance there, other than "land as soon as practicable." Just as we closed the checklist, the Stability Augmentation System failed, causing the jet to lurch to the left. I trimmed the rudder to center the ball, tried re-engaging Stab Aug and got the same results as it immediately clicked off. Hmm...plugging the KC-135 without Stab Aug didn't really appeal to me, so Al Jaber was looking more and more likely.

Now, as the OpsO and ASO, I'd always preached to leave external issues out of the cockpit when flying, but I couldn't help but think of the logistical nightmare of having a jet (or possibly two, since our wingman was dutifully following along) stuck in Kuwait and missing future OSW sorties as a result. I was still waiting for the other combined pump to fail, as is the norm for the Prowler, making the divert decision easy, but so far no "luck."

I spotted our tanker about seven NM away and was faced with Decision 3: Should I try tanking without Stab Aug? I decided to go ahead and give it a try, and if the tanking went OK, Decision 2 would be easier--we'd head to PSAB. As I lined up behind the basket, the thought ran through my head that I should let my wingman tank first so if I ended up wearing the basket, at least he'd have his gas and could get to PSAB. Decision 4: Do I back off the tanker and let him go first? One look at my fuel quantity at 5000 pounds made me decide to go first. If that other pump failed, I'd be looking at a fairly lengthy checklist to get the jet dirty via the backup methods and would need the extra gas. Also, the thought of multiple approaches at Al Jaber due to the poor visibility came to mind.

After a few stabs at the basket, we were in and taking gas. OK, things were looking up. We took about 7000 pounds, pulled out, let the wingman fuel up and proceeded south toward PSAB. The lone combined system pump was hanging in there like a champ, and the flight system was going strong as well. A visual check by our wingman didn't reveal anything leaking, smoking or otherwise unusual about the exterior of our jet, so we all breathed a little easier. About that time, the Mission Commander piped up from the back seat that we should call the Supervisor of Flying (SOF) and advise him of our situation. We Navy guys aren't used to using the SOF, but he's a great asset--kind of like a CATCC rep for the whole base.

We contacted the SOF and told him our situation and to expect a short field arrestment. He immediately got the wheels in motion and set up holding and tanking for the rest of the OSW package so we could get in first. The prescribed corridor leading from Iraq to PSAB was taking us east of the field to avoid Dhahran's airspace. I figured I didn't need any undue delay, so we elected to play the 7700 card to get priority handling direct to PSAB. It worked. As we approached the field, ATC descended us and set us up for a PAR. Once level at 5000 feet, with our wingman observing, we dirtied up. The lone combined pump strained under the load of the gear and flaps coming down, but sprang back up to 3000 PSI once everything was down and dirty. We detached the wingman for his own approach and completed our landing checklist.