Combat ORM

Flying Safety, July, 2002 by Paul Gallaher

Since the beginning of the War on Terrorism, the military has had a rash of mishaps. Of note are the high numbers of Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) mishaps. Most of the mishaps have involved airlift and helicopter type aircraft. These mishaps have occurred in various MAJCOMs.

Why have our CFIT-rates gone up? A common thread in these mishaps is a lack of effective wartime Operational Risk Management (ORM). Whether conducting a Search and Rescue (SAR) operation, a landing at a high altitude LZ or night operations into unfamiliar environments under low illumination, flight crews continue to fly good air planes into unintentional contact with Mother Earth.

Many flight crews seem to have the attitude that "We're at war; all risk is accepted." Really? If we are adhering to tatics that protect us from MANPADs or small arms fire but collide with the ground, destroying the aircraft, how is that successful? Being tactically sound does not include doing things with a high degree of risk to thwart a threat that presents a lower degree of risk.

Units need to ensure their wartime ORM process incorporates both effective factics and risk management techniques ORM is still a relatively new process, especially in the combat environment. If your risk management process is more restrictive when flying a daytime local trainer at the home-drome than it is for a combat or comabat support mission, then you probably need to overhaul your process. Here are a few items to consider when developing an effective wartime ORM process.

* Is there effective leadership oversight on crew makeup and matching the right crews/pilots to the right mission?

* Is navigational chart data recent and accurate? Are obstacles CHUMed on the charts?

* Have we been training the way we intend to fight or are we trying out tactics for the first time in a combat zone?

* Are we adhering to the mission we flight-planned? If not, what are the risks of deviating (i.e., terrain, threats, fuel management)?

* Do pilots/crews have adequate time to plan the combat mission, or are we flying combat missions with the same amount of mission planning as a home station trainer?

* If flying into a contingency field what are the concerns: airfield lighting, runway available, realistic threats, air traffic control, published approaches?

* Is there any air traffic control in the area to be flown? If so do the controllers speak English fluently?

* What are the weather patterns in the AOR? Does the pilot/ crew have experience flying in those particular weather patterns?

This short list of examples should get leaders and aviators thinking about their combat mission risk management. There are obviously other issues that can and should impact your risk management processes. This could include somato-sensory inputs such as hair standing up on the back of your neck, the ol' "pit in the stomach," or the ever popular gluteus-crunch." If something doesn't feel right when you are flying a mission, it is incumbent upon Air Force aviators to take the appropriate action to prevent a mishap.

Here's the bottom line Obviously there are times when accepting more risk on a sortie is warranted, but we need to ask a few questions before saying "Can do."

1. What are the risks to this particular mission?

2. How are the risks quantified? "We're at war, so all risk is acceptable" is the wrong answer. (After a recent Class A mishap during a contingency mission, one interviewed crew said they thought risk levels on similar missions were at the "ridiculous" level. If so, why did they continue to fly the mission?)

3. If risk levels are high, who decides to accept the risk? This goes back to a key principle of ORM Accept risk at the appropriate level. Most squadron commanders would rather be awakened in the middle of the night to discuss a mission prior to launch than get the, "We've-had-a-Class-A" call That's why they get that CC pay.

4. Are we accepting more risk in the name of tactics when the threat is not realistically present? Getting the most accurate and recent intel and tactics information is incumbent upon every crew when planning the mission.

"We're at war is no excuse for omitting ORM front your crosscheck ORM is vital, even--or especially--in combat.