How we should do business: weather doesn't always play fair …

Flying Safety, July, 2004 by Tony Barrell

Operational Risk Management (ORM) is one of the most valuable tools we have in our safety tool kits. The Air Force has spent a lot of money to give us the resources we need, to not only train our people how to use ORM, but also to provide some slick tools to assist in completing the ORM process. These tools make it easy to manage operations using ORM. For example, the Air Force Safety Center has a Web-based ORM tool that enables a person with almost any experience level to effectively work through the ORM process with a minimum of fuss. However, it's important to remember that we can make good ORM decisions even when we don't have the formal tools available.

Last December I was leading a six-ship of F-16s from Fort Worth, Texas, to a destination in the eastern Mediterranean. The aircraft were all brand-new, part of a foreign military sale delivery to another country. Unfortunately, the delivery wasn't going too smoothly.

Production problems at the factory had already delayed the delivery by a couple of weeks. Then, when we were finally ready to go, the tanker broke, and we had to delay another 24 hours. Needless to say, neither the Systems Program Office (SPO) nor the customer were very happy about the delays.

The first leg to Lajes Field, Azores, was uneventful, and the six of us spent the following day sightseeing and enjoying the local hospitality. However, it seems that the local hospitality did not agree with some of us. We had a 1 a.m. show time the next morning for a 3 a.m. launch. Two of the pilots in the flight showed up suffering from mild food poisoning. They both assured me they were good to go, but neither one of them looked well.

Then the weather forecaster delivered some more good news: The weather over the eastern Atlantic was solid clouds all the way to the Strait of Gibraltar. That meant we would fly the first three hours of the sortie on the tanker's wing, in the dark, in the weather, with two sick pilots. I knew we were all experienced, and the two sick guys assured me they would be okay, so I made the decision to press ahead with the sortie.

Our preflight and ground operations went smoothly, the tanker was ready, and it looked as though we would have an on-time takeoff. But, when I called No. 1 for the active, the tower controller told me she had a weather update for our route of flight. She said there was a report of severe thunderstorms in a line across the mouth of the Mediterranean. We would have to fly a two-hour detour around the thunderstorms just to make it into the Mediterranean!

"What should I do?" I thought. "Should I press the weather or wait a day?" I knew some of the guys in the flight were going to Rome on leave the next day and had non-refundable airline tickets for their travel. It would cost them money to reschedule their trips if we didn't take off today. Both the customer and the SPO might be upset if the aircraft showed up another day late. Plus, I thought the destination air base was closed on weekends--if I delayed, it might mean staying at Lajes all weekend. Did I even have the authority to make that decision?

On the other hand, it seemed that I had three strikes against me. From an ORM standpoint, the hazards were clear: two pilots definitely not up to their best, bad weather, and the thunderstorms. I could easily avoid all these hazards simply by delaying the launch a day.

But ORM is not just about avoiding risk. We all know we must accept some risk; otherwise we would never fly. Was this mission worth the risk? It was not an operational mission; we were not going to combat or delivering critical supplies.

So, there I was, cleared for takeoff with five guys and a tanker crew waiting for me to make a decision. And I thought, "Of course I have the authority to make this decision. I am the mission commander, and if I don't make a decision, who will?" So, I cancelled my takeoff clearance and we all taxied back to our parking spots to shut down and wait for another day.

The next day, everyone was healthy, the weather was good, and the destination air base was open and waiting for us. The flight was uneventful and we delivered six new aircraft in good condition to a grateful customer.

In retrospect, I believe I made the right choice. Neither the SPO nor the customer ever said anything to me about my decision. I did get some grief from the guys about being a wimp, but I know the two sick guys were happy about the decision. And, even though they did not explicitly say so, I think the tanker crew was happy about it, too.

When the Air Force leadership first started talking about ORM, many people complained that we didn't need ORM because that's how we did business every day. I think the best argument against that is: We need ORM because that's how we should be doing business every day, but don't. Aviation history is full of unfortunate stories where operators made poor decisions by not considering the risks. In many instances, a poor decision made after considering the risks is still better than no decision made after not considering them at all.