Army nonlethal weapons/ scalable-effects program: a think piece

Military Police, April, 2003 by Timothy J. Lamb

The Army's strategy for the employment of nonlethal weapons (NLWs) requires true scalable-effects (SE) systems capable of fulfilling the Army and joint nonlethal (NL) core capabilities of counterpersonnel, countermateriel, and countercapability. NL/SE systems will be employed across the spectrum of operations from small-scale contingencies (SSCs) to major combat operations by Objective Force line-of-sight (LOS)-, beyond-LOS (BLOS)-, and non-LOS (NLOS)-capable systems. NLWs, as modifications of existing lethal weapons systems, will evolve into true SE (lethal to NL) systems for use by Army Objective Forces. This ability to "rheostat" force and effect is revolutionary, but it will become an integral part of Objective Force capabilities.

Nonlethal Weapons and Their Roles

The 1996 Department of Defense Directive 3000.3 defines NLWs as "Weapons ... explicitly designed and primarily employed ... to incapacitate personnel or materiel ... [by] minimizing fatalities, permanent injury ... and undesired damage to property and the environment." Their effects are relatively reversible but do not have a zero probability of producing either fatalities or permanent injuries. The critical point is that NLWs are not simply systems or weapons that do not "kill." They are specifically designed and built to deliver their effects against the prescribed targets (personnel or materiel) consistent with the mandates of Department of Defense Directive 3000.3.

The Army's approved 1996 Nonlethal Mission Needs Statement and the 2000 Joint Nonlethal Mission Needs Analysis/Mission-Area Assessment requires NL core capabilities for counterpersonnel, countermateriel, and counter capability missions. Joint Vision 2020, furthermore, also calls for a precision engagement capability for any situation capable of creating "the desired lethal or NL effects." An even simpler definition is the temporary incapacitation of people, places, and things. This is the proposed definition of NL/SE that the Army should use when pursuing Future Combat System (FCS) capabilities to meet future NL requirements.

Where We Are

While the Army has fielded Nonlethal Capability Sets (NLCSs) composed of predominantly legacy blunt-impact munitions and protective gear, there is a clear need for a future capability that goes far beyond this current mix. A recent, informal survey of some combatant units was conducted to determine what capabilities they would want from new NLW systems. A summary of the results is presented here.

Personnel from the 5-20th Infantry (Stryker) Suggested--

* Cordoning off areas with temporary, easily moved NL barriers to "channelize" hostile personnel mixed with noncombatants.

* Providing temporary, mobile antivehicular NL barriers (especially in military operations on urbanized terrain [MOUT]) or restricted terrain.

* Providing an SE weapon that could stun/incapacitate or wound/kill with the "flick of a switch."

Personnel from the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) mentioned--

* Clearing buildings (MOUT) without causing damage (rubble) or noncombatant casualties.

* Breaking contact with or extracting selected personnel from a crowd.

* Developing a family of NL access-control and area-denial capabilities.

Personnel from the 5th Special Forces Group thought of--

* Providing better blunt trauma/"stunning" NL weapons.

* Securing vehicles, resupply, and rendezvous sites when teams are operating away from vehicles.

* Incapacitating vehicles at a distance (1-3 kilometers) using electronic systems/alarms/booby traps; crowds, prisoners (with a small number of guards), humans, and animals (herders with sheep) at a distance of 0-1 kilometer from strategic recon sites; and personnel when breaking contact.

* Providing a "low (no) signature" ambush which incapacitates immediately, lasts for a "variable" duration, persists for a "variable" time, and covers "variable-sized incapacitation zones."

Where We Need to Go

The Army's transformation effort is centered on the Objective Force, the centerpiece of which is the FCS with its LOS, BLOS, and NLOS SE capability. The NL/SE strategy has as its ultimate goal the delivery of a true, rheostatic SE capability for FCS platforms, crew-served weapons, and individual soldiers. This effort supports the defense planning guidance for the 2000 to 2005 and 2002 to 2007 time frames, in that the guidance cited the need for NL/SE from the tactical to the strategic levels while addressing the public demands for minimizing collateral damage and loss of innocent life "... while negating an adversary's exploitation of our rules of engagement." This new, indeed revolutionary, capability will represent a fundamental paradigm shift from NLWs suited for use in SSC situations against noncombatants to one in which NL effects are but one of the options available to commanders across the breadth of the operational spectrum. Delivering true SE weapon systems for the Objective Force will require time, money, and a focused effort to develop the technologies to meet the operational requirements.