A nonlethal ambush—a capabilities approach to the future

Military Police, April, 2003 by Joseph Barnes, Ed Lowe

Throughout the history of war, a key component of success or failure often hinged on one nation's technological superiority over another. Furthermore, the proper application of such technology fuels a nation's war machine. In the U.S. Civil War, the advent and use of the telegraph, the expansion of railhead operations, and the advancement of weaponry propelled the nature and conduct of war to a higher level.

World War I probably painted the clearest picture of technological advances outpacing existing military theories and tactics. The use of the machine gun, and the introduction of the tank and the airplane are just a few examples of the technologies introduced during this war that yielded horrific battlefield casualties. The argument has been made that the era's tactics did not match its technology. Thus, the dreadful amount of casualties produced was a direct result of the dichotomy between technology and tactics.

Almost 100 years later, military leaders continue to research and develop new weaponry and methods to attack and defeat a given enemy. Strategic-level considerations, political concerns, rules of engagement, and use-of-force criteria have modified young leaders' aggressive instinct to act with decisive--and potentially deadly--force at the first indication of trouble.

With these considerations in place, MP leaders must fully comprehend that their decisions could have positive or detrimental effects on national policy. A nonlethal (NL)-capabilities approach to training and small-scale contingencies (SSCs) offers leaders on the ground an additional course of action. Additionally, the mission may be considered a failure if deadly force is applied in a given operation.

We are using a scenario that provides a brief glimpse of what future operations may be like. Although the country and characters are purely fictitious, the situation is entirely plausible. We have interspersed specific descriptive commentaries within the scenario; the italics represent the scenario.

The situation begins like this:

Lieutenant General Slovadan Petrovic departs his hotel early in the morning, accompanied by a security detail of six soldiers (Figure 1). Moving in a two-vehicle convoy, they pass through burned-out, destroyed villages on the way to Btrovican to meet with local leaders. Two months earlier, Petrovic was under warrant for arrest by the International Court of Justice for issuing orders that led to the killing of unarmed civilians.

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

Following the International Court indictment, Petrovic skirted arrest by maneuvering around the countryside in unmarked vehicles and showing up unexpectedly at various meetings and gatherings. He even passed through several United Nations (UN) checkpoints, failing to be recognized. However, through communication signals intercepted by the National Security Agency and help from undercover agents, his location and intended movements for the day were confirmed

Through an analysis of collected data, it was determined that he would pass through a UN checkpoint (operated by U.S. military police) on the far southeastern corner of Btrovican. The checkpoint was in the exact location where the convoy would enter the town. So as not to disrupt the normal day-to-day operations of UN forces, the decision was made to use military police to apprehend the group. However, the orders defined clearly that Petrovic must be taken alive. Using the Nonlethal Capability Set (NLCS) equipment and munitions would be the preferred means to ensure mission success.

The commander's intent was to take Petrovic into custody without inflicting casualties, so he had to look outside the box for capture capabilities. Initially, the focus of the mission was to transition quickly from apprehending the security detail to rendering it impotent. So, how can a well-armed, well-trained security team be rendered immobile and out of the fight?

Two excellent new additions to the Army's inventory are part of the NLCS and can assist with this task. They are the modular crowd-control munition (MCCM) and the M1 portable vehicle-arresting barrier (PVAB). As illustrated, the MCCM is very similar to the old ground-emplaced claymore mine, except that the charge has been tapered down, and it is filled with six hundred 32-caliber rubber pellets instead of lethal ones.

In terms of an arresting barrier, the M1 PVAB is similar in content to the arresting barriers used aboard aircraft carriers to catch and stop landing planes. It can stop a vehicle (up to 7,500 M1 PVAB pounds) at speeds up to 45 miles per hour with a stopping distance of less than 200 feet. The M1 PVAB not only renders the vehicle inoperable but also encapsulates the occupants, preventing their escape.

Just inside the checkpoint into Btrovican, a fork in the road allows drivers to go east or northeast. Both roads are only wide enough for one vehicle. It's about 500 meters from the entry to the village's main street.

Petrovic's two-vehicle convoy takes the northeastern route. Two MI PVABs have been pre-positioned approximately 200 meters apart; area debris already provides adequate camouflage. Additionally, at approximately 50 meters from the road's end, a series of twenty MCCMs, also camouflaged, are positioned along the sides of the road (Figure 2). Caltrops can also be used as an additional measure, ensuring that the vehicles are rendered immobile. Caltrops are four-pronged metal pieces, approximately 2 inches tall, that puncture tires or boots. A soldier can easily employ caltrops by attaching fifty of them to five hundred and fifty cords and scattering them in a designated camouflage area. As the convoy approaches this point, the MCCMs, from closest to farthest, are detonated, providing the desired effect; both vehicles retreat to avoid the threat to their front.