From Kuwait to Baghdad

Military Police, April, 2004 by Lesley Kipling, Ted Spain

On 16 March 2003, the V Corps commander summoned his division and brigade commanders to a meeting at Camp New York, Kuwait. Over the past months, these commanders had spent seemingly endless hours together, discussing missions and strategies for a possible invasion of Iraq. As the 18th Military Police Brigade commander headed to the meeting, he had no reason to suspect that this session would be any different. However, he soon realized that this was not going to be another meeting about hypothetical dates and possible missions. Instead of the usual greetings and chitchat, the officers sat rigidly in their seats with serious expressions, aware of the magnitude of the task ahead.

**********

The V Corps commander informed them of President Bush's intent to give Saddam Hussein and his sons 48 hours to get out of Iraq, after which V Corps had to be prepared to take military action. He directed his commanders to use the next two days to make final preparations and allow soldiers one last shower and hot meal. He looked around the room at his commanders--who thought of their soldiers, knowing that some of them would not make it home--and told them "the next time I see all of you will be in Baghdad." The following night, President Bush addressed the nation and the world and directed Saddam Hussein and his sons to leave Iraq.

While the division commanders prepared their units, the commander of the 18th was trying to determine how to accomplish the brigade missions and tasks with only two military police companies with equipment, four military police companies without equipment, a mechanized infantry battalion, a battalion headquarters, and a brigade headquarters. Changes to the force flow over the previous two months resulted in military police units being pushed back to make room for more combat arms units in theater. Faced with a mission that required 50 military police companies, this task organization of 20 companies (with only 6 actually in theater), was forced to assume multiple military police roles.

As the U.S. military began air strikes against Iraq, personnel and equipment from the 18th Military Police Battalion were in various states of readiness. As the 3d Infantry Division (3ID) crossed the berm into Iraq, personnel from the 720th Military Police Battalion headquarters (Fort Hood, Texas) arrived in Kuwait and prepared to download unit equipment and conduct reception, staging, onward-movement, and integration (RSOI) operations. The headquarters detachment of the 519th Military Police Battalion (Fort Polk, Louisiana) arrived in theater on 20 March; however, its equipment, which had just been loaded at Fort Polk, would not arrive for another month. At the same time, the 18th's headquarters detachment and the 709th Military Police Battalion (Hanau, Germany)--the only organic battalion of the 18th that deployed to Iraq--were downloading shipping containers (CONEXes) in Kuwait and loading equipment into vehicles in preparation for the push into Iraq.

The 503d Military Police Battalion (Fort Bragg, North Carolina) and the 115th Military Police Battalion (Maryland Army National Guard) had just loaded their equipment stateside. The 211th Military Police Battalion (Massachusetts Army National Guard) was still activated from its deployment to Afghanistan and was preparing to fly to Kuwait. Within the theater of operations, the 400th Military Police Battalion (Maryland Army Reserve) was task-organized under the 18th to assist with increasing detention operations. The 168th Military Police Battalion (Tennessee Army National Guard) had just been mobilized and was the final military police battalion to arrive in theater to serve under the 18th.

With so few military police available initially, the 18th did not have the capability to perform doctrinal rear-area security functions. Due to the criticality of this function--especially in the eyes of the V Corps deputy commander--1st Battalion, 41st (1-41) Infantry Regiment (Mechanized) (Fort Riley, Kansas) was called upon to perform the mission. For the purpose of unity of command, the 1-41 was task-organized as a subordinate unit under the 18th. The 1-41, comprised of more than 700 soldiers and their accompanying equipment (tanks, Abrams and Bradley fighting vehicles, and mortars), proved to be a valuable asset that would be tested in its unique role as the V Corps tactical combat force. At the onset of the war, the unit had the mission of clearing Alternate Supply Route (ASR) Tornado, to enable the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) to establish a forward arming and refueling point to support forces to the north. The 18th also employed the 1-41, in conjunction with the 709th Military Police Battalion, to secure Tallil Air Base (which would later become a key theater life support area [LSA]).

The 3ID was advancing quickly, and its division company--the 3d Military Police Company--had to keep up as it pushed north. On 22 March, the 709th, with the 527th Military Police Company (Giessen, Germany) and the 551st Military Police Company (Fort Campbell, Kentucky) crossed the Kuwaiti border and entered Iraq. As soldiers from the headquarters detachment of the 709th and the 1-41 were moving forward, the soldiers in the headquarters detachment of the 18th were conducting final precombat checks, preparing to jump the brigade tactical operations center, and getting a few hours of sleep before crossing into Iraq the following morning.