Military police operations in Fallujah

Military Police, April, 2005 by John Hammond

Scalpel Versus Bayonet

Fallujah, Iraq, is arguably one of the most dangerous places on earth. It is also home to more than 300,000 Iraqis (many of whom are fervent supporters of the previous regime) and a large number of foreign terrorists. On two occasions in 2003, the V Corps commander called on the Military Police Corps to form a unique type of task force (TF) to conduct unconventional operations. When the insurgent attacks in Fallujah had spiraled out of control and a new strategy was needed to address the situation, V Corps organized a TF with special capabilities to address this dangerous development. The TF combined the skill sets of the military police with the intelligence-gathering capabilities of counterintelligence (CI) and psychological operations (PSYOP) teams. This formidable asset was then integrated, with great success, with the combat arms elements operating in this troubled region.

The primary mission for this new TF was to identify, locate, and capture or kill threat forces operating in a specific area. The ability to execute a cordon and search operation is not a skill unique to the military police; many units perform this mission. However, based on their training and experience, the military police achieve a greater level of precision. This reduces the collateral damage sometimes associated with this type of operation. Failing to control collateral damage will ultimately aid the enemy. Local civilians usually know who the insurgents are. If innocent civilians are killed, it angers the general population, who eventually will provide either passive or active support for the insurgents. A successful raid is a surgical event that is performed with speed, surprise, and skill. Although any unit can perform this task, the military police platoon operates more like a scalpel and less like a bayonet. Both will get the job done, but one may be a little messier. That is why the military police were selected for this mission.

The success of this concept is far-reaching and could serve as a model for future operations in the Global War on Terrorism. Military police will continue to execute this type of mission in Iraq and in any future theater in that war. The execution of the raid is only one aspect of this operation, which also includes intelligence gathering and targeting. Precision, speed, and stealth are critical components that are the calling cards of the military police platoon executing this mission. Unfortunately, soldiers who have taken part in a military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) exercise feel confident that they are proficient in cordon and search operations. Since most large combat arms units operating in Iraq are not accustomed to working with military police, they perform the raids themselves and leave the military police to their traditional missions of security operations. The problem is that the rumbling of tracked vehicles can be felt and heard from a mile away. This sometimes signals the raid and results in the loss of surprise, the escape of target insurgents, and an increased risk to the soldiers executing the raid.

Battalion Mission

In the following paragraphs, I will provide some insight into the mission set for my battalion and the subsequent results. To avoid security concerns, I will speak in generalities. Specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) can be addressed in a separate venue. I hope that the valuable lessons learned from this unique operational capability will not be lost in today's fluid environment. Military police commanders should continue to train on the core mission of cordon and search operations and educate their commands about the unique skills of the military police. US forces are fighting an asymmetrical war that requires battlefield commanders to adjust their strategies and tactics constantly and to fight using unconventional methods. The enemy has learned this lesson well and continues to evolve. Adjusting doctrine and tactics is a critical element in safeguarding soldiers. Precision raids will continue to play a major role in defeating the enemy.

The first organization to conduct this operation in Fallujah was TF Gauntlet, in support of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR). Shortly after arriving in Fallujah, TF Gauntlet received additional assets from the 3d ACR, and these combined assets resulted in great success and improved TTP. The situation stabilized in Fallujah, and the soldiers of TF Gauntlet returned to their battalion. In late May 2003, the situation in Fallujah had once again deteriorated. I received word to stand up a second TF, similar to TF Gauntlet, to conduct operations in Fallujah. This new organization was designated TF Enforcer by V Corps.

My initial concern in preparing for this mission was that it would require me to execute two battalion level operations in two separation regions of Iraq at the same time. When I received the mission, my battalion was decisively engaged in securing the V Corps logistical hub. I was fortunate to have a great staff of talented officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) from which to draw for my second headquarters. New units would then comprise the remainder of the TF. Although it was a challenge to perform these simultaneous missions, it was not impossible. A military police battalion placed in support of a division can execute a traditional mission of combat support while simultaneously executing direct-action operations ill support of a brigade commander in a division trouble spot. However, I would recommend that the two missions take place in the same region. The real challenge was balancing the needs of both missions. My executive officer oversaw operations at the first site while I deployed to Fallujah with the assault command post (ACP), as V Corps designated that as my main effort. I urge all battalion commanders to develop an ACP and train on it before deployment. Developing an ACP will provide a unique asset for deployments and will result in a better-trained staff.