Military police operations in Fallujah

Military Police, April, 2005 by John Hammond

Commanders at every level must lead from the front if they hope to succeed in this rapidly changing asymmetrical environment. Every successful commander I observed or worked with in either Iraq or Afghanistan followed this practice. To maintain my own situational awareness. I traveled with a different patrol each night and oversaw most direct-action raids. To gauge their condition, I talked with the soldiers each night before we went out on patrol. Over time, the ambushes certainly began to take their toll, and I decreased the operational tempo accordingly. It was extremely challenging to balance the mission with the operational effectiveness of soldiers subjected to the strain of this terrible environment. It is impossible for commanders to gauge this if they are not out front with their troops. Battalion commanders are responsible for maneuvering platoons on the battlefield, while captains maneuver squads. This principle requires leaders to have eyes on their operational elements during combat operations. My platoon leaders, in conjunction with their company commanders, planned and executed most missions, while I approved the plans, monitored the situation, and coordinated additional resources if needed. I felt this was necessary since the situation was extremely fluid and the rules of engagement (ROE) were confusing. Although my forward presence could be seen as cumbersome by those more comfortable with a decentralized leadership philosophy, it was quite necessary. This technique allowed platoon leaders to remain focused on their mission, while I worked response issues and provided on-the-spot guidance when the situation took a drastic turn. This allowed us to transition rapidly to a dynamic mode or quickly put a lid on a mission and "bring it down a notch" when necessary. Raids were conducted by day and patrols were conducted at night. It was a dangerous routine, but intelligence improved every day and the TF began taking down bigger targets and slowly gaining control of the city. If soldiers do not see their leaders taking the same risks as they do in this hellish environment, it will certainly affect their morale. In addition, if commanders are not out on patrol with the soldiers, it is impossible to maintain accurate situational awareness and adjust tactics in a timely manner.

The operational climate in Iraq can change quickly, requiring an immediate change in mission or demanding additional guidance. To respond to this condition of battle, we established a mobile tactical operations center (TOC) that developed better command, control, and security for patrols operating in the city. The mobile TOC was designed to overcome the delays in the quick reaction force response time, eliminate communications failures, and provide a forward command and control element able to respond to changing situations. It linked multiple patrols with the rear command post at the forward operating base. In some cases, it operated in conjunction with hunter-killer teams to maneuver forces. In other cases, it coordinated actions during deliberate raids. The mobile TOC allowed a coordinated response to an ambush by maneuvering organic assets or by requesting additional support from the air cavalry or infantry. Air cavalry assets were frequently requested and coordinated during patrols or raids.