Integrating criminal itelligence operations in the heartland

Military Police, March, 2002 by Mike French, Jim Klotz

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon confronted our nation and Army with a chilling reality of warfare in the twenty-first century--the modern battlefield now extends to America's heartland and our own backyards. Clear distinctions between acts of crime and acts of war have now been blurred by the ruthless assaults of transnational terrorists. As we in the MP and criminal investigation (CID) communities respond to these clearly demonstrated and very real domestic threats, we are now being called on, domestically, to perform many of our wartime missions, including intelligence operations--police intelligence operations for MP and criminal intelligence operations for CID.

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Doctrinal Issues

Despite this increased emphasis, general weakness remains in widely accepted and Army-approved doctrine relating to police and criminal intelligence operations, especially as it relates to formalized processes for collection, integration, analysis, and dissemination. Given that the Army only recently (within the last 5 years or so) assigned these wartime tasks formally to MP and CID elements, this weakness in our doctrine is understandable. Doctrine often captures the lessons of the last "war." Much of the current MP and CID doctrine reflects thinking developed and lessons learned over the course of the Cold War. Warfare in the twenty-first century is obviously very different and requires new doctrinal approaches to virtually every aspect of Army operations--MP and CID intelligence operations are no different.

This is not to suggest there is no doctrine relating to police and criminal intelligence operations. We have been performing these missions (and doing them well) since our inception. Instead, the evolution of modern warfare has forced the Army to recognize the battlefield relevance of police and criminal intelligence operations in modern military undertakings and not simply their combat support relevance. This recognition is now evident across the operational spectrum, whether in peace enforcement operations (as in the Balkans), in domestic force protection operations, (as we are now fully engaged in), or on the physical battlefield (as in Afghanistan). The Army's recognition of this critical MP/CID intelligence role alone, however, is not sufficient. There is still the need for coherent police and criminal intelligence doctrine that adds analytic rigor to our familiar processes, generates useful intelligence products, and communicates in terms that supported commanders are accustomed to hearing.

The Fort Riley, Kansas, CID Battalion, is attempting to address these doctrinal issues through the use of a test-bed initiative--the Criminal Intelligence Management and Integration Center (CIMIC). Following September 11th, we established an effort to respond to current operational needs and address the "seams" in police and criminal intelligence techniques, tactics, procedures, and policy within the MP Corps family and among key force protection functionaries--including military intelligence and federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities.

Battalion CIMIC

The principal purpose of CIMIC is to support local commanders by organizing and integrating national, regional, and local police and criminal intelligence information. It seeks enough information to provide a coherent, full-spectrum response to threats posed by terrorism, criminal hatred, extremism, gang activity, and related indiscipline, including illicit drug and firearms trafficking and use.

The objectives of CIMIC are to--

* Improve criminal and police intelligence support to installation-level commanders and help them tailor their force protection activities.

* Provide all the battalion CID elements with a common operational picture across the 13-state Fort Riley CID Battalion's area of responsibility (AOR) (see Figure 1, page 32).

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* Foster closer cooperation among law enforcement agencies.

* Develop better intelligence relationships with the military intelligence community at each supported installation and their higher headquarters while trying to help make each installation safer and more secure.

Figure 2 depicts criminal intelligence relationships at the local, regional, and national levels. At the installation level, MP and CID operations are fairly well-defined and -practiced. Criminal intelligence operations at the national level are reasonably well-established and -integrated. However, the same may not be said of regional police and criminal intelligence operations that the MP and CID perform. CIMIC was formed, equipped, and staffed to fill this regional intelligence gap.

[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]

After polling senior installation leaders across the AOR, some common themes emerged. Among them was the view that although the CID provided excellent investigative support and was well connected to the local communities (provost marshal's office, staff judge advocate, and local commanders), more work needed to be done in the police and criminal intelligence gathering and crime analysis areas. Commanders said that they received plenty of data but not enough useful information and analysis to support policy formulation and decision-making. CIMIC strives to provide the missing information and analysis.