The Air Force and Future Space Directions

Aerospace Power Journal, Spring, 2001 by Simon Peter Worden

Are We Good Stewards?

Editorial Abstract: The space-power debate continues. In this response, General Worden argues that the aerospace integration approach to space power is not only consistent with time-tested Air Force doctrine, NCA priorities, and commercial realities, but it also makes the most sense, given that the Air Force has not been given the "space stewardship" mission. In General Worden's view, if the Air Force deserves criticism in its approach to space, it is for its slowness to demonstrate and test sortie-type systems for space access and space control.

THE MOUNTING DIALOGUE over the future space role of the Air Force is very interesting and important. The article by Lt Col Peter Hays and Dr. Karl Mueller ("Going Boldly--Where? Aerospace Integration, the Space Commission, and the Air Force's Vision for Space") in this issue certainly contributes to the aerospace conversation, but it also needs further comment. Their article discusses, and in some cases criticizes, some of the space approaches outlined in previous issues of this journal: Lt Col Cynthia McKinley's proposal for a space "Coast Guard" ("The Guardians of Space: Organizing America's Space Assets for the Twenty-First Century," Spring 2000); Maj Gen John Barry and Col Darrell Herriges's treatise on today's aerospace integration (Al) approach ("Aerospace Integration, Not Separation," Summer 2000); and Lt Gen Bruce Carlson's discussion of future options for space control to protect commercial activities in space ("Protecting Global Utilities: Safeguarding the Next Millennium's Space-Based Public Servic es," Summer 2000). In particular, they suggest that the Al approach is not persuasive and should not represent the Air Force approach toward space in the years ahead. While many of Hays's and Mueller's points are valid, their criticisms are mostly "straw men" set up and knocked down.

Much of the problem is a failure to separate strategy and mission from basic doctrine, operational doctrine, and tactical doctrine. Strategy and mission are not fundamentally Air Force corporate concerns. These are set by the National Command Authorities (NCA) and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. [1] Conversely, basic aerospace doctrine is concerned with how we organize for and use the aerospace environment. Operational doctrine guides the proper employment of aerospace forces to achieve objectives. Tactical doctrine details specifics of using individual aerospace systems. [2] The various articles cited above involve different aspects of the doctrinal confusion about air and space. This response to them argues the following points: (1) we currently have a basic aerospace strategy and mission--to rapidly deter or defeat two nearly simultaneous, large-scale acts of aggression in different theaters (the "two major theater war" [or 2MTW] strategy that has been issued to us by the NCA and joint community); (2) curre nt aerospace basic doctrine, which stresses centralized control and decentralized execution, is as sound for space and information capabilities as it is for traditional air capabilities; (3) operational doctrine for space and information systems needs to be developed as these capabilities are integrated into our forces (the premise of the Barry-Herriges AI article); and (4) we must develop new aerospace capabilities to do "space sorties" before we can truly take proper advantage of space.

Any discussion of the Air Force's approach to developing and using space capabilities must begin with the admonition that the Air Force doesn't operate in a vacuum (space excepted). Yet, there seems to be an attitude afoot that the current national security space debate is largely internal to the Air Force. Some believe that senior Air Force leadership has close to one hundred billion dollars per year to spend and could choose simply to redirect it, based on internal strategic decisions. Anyone working for a few minutes on the Air Staff knows that senior Air Force leadership's flexibility extends not much further than lunch money. In fact, the job of the Air Force is to train, organize, and equip forces to meet the nation's security needs as defined by the joint war-fighting community, senior defense officials, and, ultimately, the NCA. As Air Force leadership has repeatedly stated to Congress, we are woefully underfunded to accomplish assigned missions, let alone prepare for new ones. However, it is very mu ch within our "job jar" to provide aerospace options for current and future national security needs. One of our nation's very great strengths lies in having multiple services with differing doctrines and capabilities providing national leadership with a range of options and approaches for meeting these needs.

As Hays and Mueller point out, much of the increased attention to space is in response to the congressionally mandated Space Commission, whose report was due out in January 2001. While some would say that the Air Force has not been a good steward of space, we must all understand the Air Force position on this issue. [3] In short, the Air Force does not have an assigned responsibility to be the "steward" for space, and Air Force leadership has been quite reasonable in its approach to the situation. They have told the commission that the Air Force would eagerly become the "space steward," but it must have that mission assigned along with the resources to accomplish it. That new responsibility would be consistent with the current approach to missions the Air Force already is assigned--which is the main point General Barry and Colonel Herriges were stating in their AI article.