Political-Military Engagement Policy - American people's opinion of casualties in war

Aerospace Power Journal, Spring, 2001 by Kent D. Johnson

KENT D. JOHNSON [*]

Casualty Avoidance and the American Public

RECENTLY WE HAVE heard much discussion regarding the apparent unwillingness of the American people to accept casualties during military conflicts. Indeed, many commentators insist that the American casualty-avoidance mind-set has so hamstrung the US political leadership that it faces monumental political risk by supporting any military operation that generates casualties. In a broad sense, this sweeping generalization has its merits when one recognizes the influence of American public opinion on US military-engagement decisions. However, to say that the American public is so squeamish that it is unwilling to accept casualties in all military engagements is wrong-headed and ignores many complicating factors, such as the role of the media, mission objectives, the threat to US vital interests, and a phenomenon I call the "Family Factor," described below. What follows is an explanation of how these elements combine to form an easily understood theory of why Americans are not actually phobic about military casual ties.

After the disastrous results of a poorly led military adventure in Vietnam, everyone generally agreed there would be "no more Vietnams." That experience deeply affected the American public, who felt that any future military operation ran the risk of escalating into another ill-considered and poorly led conflict. This concern ran through the military as well. Indeed, as young, professional soldiers fighting a war the political leadership would not let them win, Gen Colin Powell and Gen Norman Schwarzkopf were profoundly influenced by their experiences in Vietnam and became strong supporters of the "Weinberger doctrine," which became a major factor in our Gulf War victory and in the retention of public support for Operation Desert Storm, despite the threat of thousands of American casualties.

Speaking to the National Press Club in November 1984, Caspar W. Weinberger, President Reagan's secretary of defense, set out what he considered appropriate conditions for the use of American troops: (1) when political efforts fail; (2) when one intends to win; (3) when the mission is vital to US national interests; (4) when one has well-defined political and military goals and an end state one is fighting to achieve; (5) when one is willing to reassess the size, composition and mission; and (6) when one has the support of the American people. Of all these conditions, I think a well-defined and well-understood "vital national interest" is key to ensuring American public support, which, in turn, influences all other criteria. Further, differentiating between "vital national interest" and "national interest" is critical to understanding the apparently conflicted casualty-avoidance mind-set of Americans.

A vital national interest is directly tied to the peace and security of the United States. If such an interest is threatened, the peace and security-- the very survival--of the nation may be at risk. Therefore, defense of vital national interests requires a commitment to fight and, if need be, die for them. Because countries need oil in the same way humans need water, the free flow of oil from the Middle East is vital to the peace and security of the United States. Therefore, it is a vital national interest. Public support for defending a vital national interest ensures that casualties, while mourned, will not necessarily undermine American involvement or commitment to fight and win.

A national interest, however, is related to the principles set forth in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Such principles as economic freedom, individual liberty, and human rights are very important to the American public and the US government. Indeed, because of our belief in the rights of people to be free and self-determining, it is in the best interest of the United States to globally support and promote economic freedom, individual liberty, and human rights. Although promoting the national interest is worthy of political and economic support, it is not worth fighting and losing American lives. In this case, the American people would not support foreign military intervention to promote national interests because there is no direct threat to the peace and security of the United States. For example, President Clinton recently declared the spread of AIDS in Africa a national-security threat to the United States. Obviously, AIDS in Africa, while definitely an item of national interest, is hardly a threat to our peace and security.

Understanding the difference between a vital national interest and a national interest is crucial to comprehending the "Family Factor," mentioned earlier. That is, the president may declare that something is vital to the national security of the United States, but until his judgment is validated by the American people (i.e., parents), this issue/threat is simply not going to be worth the nation's blood. In that case, parents will object, and the political risk associated with placing American troops in harm's way is very real--and very dangerous.