Technology for the Future Leader: International Command and Control Enhancements

Aerospace Power Journal, Summer, 2001 by Gilles Van Nederveen

CAPT GILLES VAN NEDERVEEN [*]

Editor's Note: PIREP is aviation shorthand for pilot report. It a means for one pilot to pass on current, potentially useful information to other pilots. In the same fashion, we intend to use this department to let readers know about aerospace-power items of interest.

THE INFORMATION AGE has rapidly accelerated the exchange of information on the battlefield. Improved technology has enhanced the visibility of the battle space, removing much uncertainty and allowing the automation of many complex and contingent decisions (e.g., target/weapon pairing). The greatest challenge will be determining how to apply new capabilities to increase the speed and quality of decision making in command and control ([C.sup.2]) systems and processes. For the modern military; [C.sup.2] still entails answering three basic questions: Where are my forces on the battle space? Where is the enemy? What is he doing? To find the answers, we must collect data to understand the situation (battlespace awareness), explore alternative courses of action, make decisions, and deploy/employ forces to execute the plan (battle management). Future leaders will need to understand how to operate in an environment where information is universally available and [C.sup.2] is governed by new paradigms.

Modernization of the [C.sup.2] environment will occur in five areas: improved battle-space visualization, more adaptive decision malting, agile battle management, information-enabled organizations, and significant increases in force effectiveness and efficiency. Battle-space visualization will allow commanders and staffs improved access to information that is complete, current, and consistent, as well as understandable. Improved battle-space visualization will enhance adaptive decision malting so that decisions are made in the context of a complete situation--not just fragments. The information must be provided in time for the user to take appropriate action and must meet a higher standard of accuracy than the current requirement. Information must be consistent across all command centers and echelons, across all functional areas, and over time. The exchange of knowledge will include understanding the situation and making projections about the future state of the battle space, including possible emergent situ ations and alternative futures, as well as their associated uncertainties. When coupled with a highly responsive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability, new information technologies will allow continuous consultation and coordination. The result of these improvements will be the creation of information-enabled organizations characterized by virtual teams, established and disestablished as the situation requires. Command will decentralize as information and communications become more available to subordinate organizations.

In the aftermath of the Balkans operations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has released new guidance on [C.sup.2] for command-post exercises--specifically, tighter political control than was the case in the Cold War era. Obviously, this could affect military effectiveness. Although the military may want to create the conditions for overwhelming force and decisive strikes, political considerations could lead to the incremental application of force alongside political, economic, and media pressures. The constant media presence will influence both governments and public support. The speed of modern communications allows media reporting to travel faster than orders through the military chain of command. As a result, senior military officers and politicians may well be tempted to bypass the chain and intervene at lower levels, based upon media reports alone. The need to minimize casualties and collateral damage will have an impact on orders of battle, operational doctrine, tactics, and weapons. Man euver, rather than attrition and force-on-force engagements, may be the answer. Headquarters staffs will have to include a deputy commander for operations, a legal adviser, and a political adviser to support commanders, who may spend more time talking to the media than to their subordinates.

Although the United States has numerous developments in progress, foreign countries are working on initiatives to realize a new [C.sup.2] vision. NATO is developing an air command and control system (ACCS) to replace its air defense ground-environment system. [1] ACCS will provide air [C.sup.2] capabilities in static and deployable configurations from the north coast of Norway to eastern Turkey. The system unites missions traditionally managed by separate systems within NATO--air defense, air offense, and air support. The common operating environment will link NATO countries in combined air operations centers (AOC) and permit sending a common air picture down to the squadron level. Alliance sensors, such as airborne warning and control system aircraft, will provide input directly into the common operating environment. Communication configurations are currently being tested in four NATO air facilities. Integration of airborne ground surveillance--either airborne standoff radar or some other "to be bought" NAT O system--is also planned. In light of the deployments now conducted by NATO and Europe outside the traditional Central European area of concern, parts of the system will be deployable, giving NATO a robust [C.sup.2] capability in contingencies.