How Effective Is Strategic Bombing? Lessons Learned from World War II to Kosovo. - Review - book review

Aerospace Power Journal, Summer, 2001 by Lt Col Eric Ash

How Effective Is Strategic Bombing? Lessons Learned from World War II to Kosovo by Gian P. Gentile. New York University Press (http://www.nyupress.nyu.edu), 838 Broadway, 3d Floor, New York, New York 10003-4812, 2001, 280 pages, $29.00.

Perhaps some readers might categorize How Effective Is Strategic Bombing? as a book written by an Army author promoting a conspiracy theory against the Air Force by hunting for airpower Rasputins who manipulated the historical picture of strategic bombing in order to promote Air Force independence. But there is certainly something to be said for a book that makes an argument--and this is a good one.

Today, we hear much about "effects-based targeting" and so forth. Effects are important, and sometimes the effects of surveys like the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) are as significant as or perhaps have even greater impact strategically than that of bombs themselves. Gian P. Gentile tells this story in compelling form.

His scholarly work analyzes the processes and outcome of the USSBS and the more recent Gulf War Airpower Survey (GWAPS) to show that preconceived theories and agendas manipulated the results of the USSBS and attempted to influence the GWAPS, despite sincere attempts on the part of survey participants and initiators to create balanced and objective reports. The major issue on the table following World War II, of course, was an independent air force with a raison d'etre of strategic bombing; hence, a supportive USSBS would clearly help promote the cause. Indeed, huge programmatic issues at stake would continue with significant interservice rivalry, as seen in subsequent episodes like the Revolt of the Admirals in 1949. Some of the historical issues raised in this book come to light today in the confusing and delayed release of the Kosovo strategic-bombing report, which has led to speculation and ambiguity.

Through meticulous analysis of primary sources, especially the USSBS and GWAPS, Gentile has contributed an important piece to the historiography of aerial bombardment. His book complements the excellent work of David MacIsaac, which for years has stood alone on the shelf as a historical interpretation of the USSBS. Gentile's superbly written chronicle of the survey process of American bombing and subsequent results is particularly helpful in discussing the effects of bombing on morale and the complex interaction of political and military factors at play in national decisions concerning war termination or defeat. It also provides a perceptive comparison of the USSBS and the GWAPS to suggest that the survey process has matured.

If this book has a shortcoming--and most books aren't perfect--it would be the title, which is slightly misleading. This is not really a history of strategic bombing and lessons learned, but a historical analysis of some important and highly influential American surveys of certain bombing campaigns. In that regard, the history of strategic bombing is international--unless one takes such an ethnocentric perspective that only the United States and its allies have done it. Limited primarily to an American perspective in terms of thinkers and campaigns, the book could benefit from an initial definitional development of strategic bombing compared to other concepts of aerial bombing.

As Gentile makes clear, the USSBS and the GWAPS were exhaustive studies--the former intended to be scientifically based and to take a broad, systemic approach in analyzing bombing effects on national economic, command, and industrial systems. The latter would take a similar approach but would benefit from academic rigor and scholarly interpretation of facts. Yet, no surveys can or should take on biblical importance.