Strategy, Air Strike and Small Nations. - Review - book review

Aerospace Power Journal, Fall, 2000 by Phillip S. Meilinger

Strategy, Air Strike and Small Nations by Shaun Clarke. Air Power Studies Centre (http://www.defence.gov.au/aerospacecentre), RAAF Base, Fairbairn ACT 2600, Australia, 1999, 204 pages (softbound).

This is one of the freshest and most original books on airpower theory I have read in some time. Wing Comdr Shaun Clarke, a Royal New Zealand air force officer, is an unusually clear-thinking, insightful, and gifted writer. Most of what is written today concerning airpower comes from the pens of "large nation" airmen. Clarke questions whether such writings are applicable to the air arms of the world's 129 "small nations" that possess an air-strike capability. He therefore sets about examining the issue of strategic air attack and its relevance to a New Zealand-Australian alliance that possesses 150 strike aircraft. The results of his inquiry are important.

The air arms of small nations tend to emphasize the support of ground forces. This is due to the traditional dominance of defense establishments by armies; the "junior partner" status of small nations involved in coalitions; the high cost of quality air arms, which reduces their number and gives them less clout than their more numerous surface brethren; and the belief that strategic air attack requires mass--an attribute unobtainable by small nations. Only the last item can claim any sort of logical legitimacy--tradition is hardly a worthy criterion for a defense force structure. In the past decade, the emergence of highly effective and inexpensive precision-guided munitions (PGM) has demolished the barrier of mass. Precision weapons make aircraft exponentially more effective than they used to be--small nations can now "punch above their weight." As a consequence, these air forces, despite their size, can now play a far greater role and thus obtain better status at the defense table.

If PGMs make strategic air strikes feasible for small nations, then the next question concerns what the primary targets should be. After a good discussion of various targeting theories, Clarke focuses on the enemy's leadership as the key center of gravity in a state: it must be induced to modify its behavior and accede to the attacker's wishes. He coins a term, "SPOT (strategic persuasion oriented targeting] bombing," that employs a detailed intelligence assessment of an adversary and that utilizes PGMs to produce the maximum effect on the enemy leadership. Of importance, unlike the guidance of US Air Force doctrine, a high tempo for these air attacks is not necessary--indeed, it is problematic for a small nation. The author concludes with the caveat that SPOT bombing will almost certainly become part of a larger package of military, economic, and political levers designed to influence an adversary. Airpower cannot do it alone.

This is an interesting proposal, but Clarke is too modest. His basic goal--to use precision airpower, discreetly directed at high-value targets, to ensure maximum political impact--is valid for large nations as well as small ones. Indeed, one would hope that the United States would follow a similar formula, despite its bounteous air assets. One concern, however, is Clarke's emphasis on leadership targeting, which parallels the recent theories of John Boyd and John Warden. Both of them turned away from the economic-based targeting models of earlier air strategists and focused instead on the enemy leaders. In essence, Boyd sought to confuse the enemy leaders while Warden sought to eliminate, overthrow, or at least isolate them from their military forces and people. Clarke follows this trend. The problem with the leadership-targeting model is that precious little empirical evidence exists to show how or even if such a targeting strategy will work. Theoretically, the concept is logical, almost commonsensical, but one finds few instances in history when a leadership change has led to a change of policy benefiting the attacker. Usually, political behavior does not change when a leader falls--as was the case with Tsar Nicholas, Emperor Franz Joseph, Neville Chamberlain, Hideki Tojo, and Ho Chi Minh. In some cases--France in 1871 or Somalia in 1993--the "leaders" do not have sufficient control over the people to effect a change of policy. If, on the other hand, Clarke's intent is merely to influence incumbent leaders and not replace them, the method of how, exactly, one does so is not obvious. Air strategists thus return to the same problem they began with: determining which targets will have the maximum impact on the enemy.

It may be unfair to cast stones at Clarke over this issue. His basic theme is an inherently useful and important one. Small nations have limited resources with which to gain their ends. Every shot must count; therefore, it is absolutely imperative that their air planners focus, define, and prioritize. Precision attack by air now offers substantial opportunities for the small powers because it combines low risk with low cost to achieve large results. Clarke offers a useful first step for air planners to think through--specifically, how to achieve this formula.