Who's Got the Big Picture? - Single Integrated Air Picture, integration of air reconnaissance systems

Aerospace Power Journal, Fall, 2001 by Louis S. METZGER, Donald R. Erbschloe

Editorial Abstract: A recent bombing accident in Kuwait underscores the fact that the Air Force can benefit from clearer operational pictures and external aids. Ironically, however, the Navy rather than the Air Force has taken the lead on the Single Integrated Air Picture, an effort to improve defensive capabilities. In this article, the Air Force chief scientist and his military assistant advocate that the Air Force become the prime mover in obtaining a better integrated surface picture in order to enhance operational capabilities.

ON 12 MARCH 2001, during a nighttime close air support exercise at the Al Udairi Range in Kuwait, a US Navy F/A-18C accidentally dropped three 500-pound bombs on a manned observation post. Five Americans and one New Zealander were killed. Eleven individuals, including six Kuwaiti troops, were injured in the incident.

The report from the ensuing investigation listed three contributing factors: (1) nonstandard and misleading assessments of the aircraft's heading during its bombing run (by the forward air controller); (2) a loss of situational awareness by the ground forward air controller during the terminal control phase; and (3) environmental conditions at the range that complicated visual acquisition of the target. [1]

The Need for Operational Pictures

In short, because three key players--the aircraft, the forward air controller, and the ground forward air controller--had inconsistent "pictures" of what was happening that March evening, the resulting actions led to tragic consequences. Similarly, the accidental shootdown of two Army Blackhawk helicopters by two Air Force F-15s during Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq in 1994 provides another example of a "friendly fire" mistake caused by having the wrong picture. [2]

Military history is replete with the consequences of misperceived pictures, clouded by the fog of war--not only friendly fire incidents such as those noted above, but also battles and wars lost. [3] Confusion, misidentification, and conflicts in tracking and reporting become increasingly likely as the battlefield grows larger and includes a greater variety of players (both joint and coalition). Today, the convergence of three factors is causing us to focus on achieving better, more consistent, and more accurate pictures to guide our military actions: (1) decreasing tolerance for casualties and collateral damage; (2) the ability of modern technology, if properly employed, to substantially improve the clarity of our shared situational awareness; and (3) our desire to enable war-fighting strategies that depend on having a clearer and more timely picture than our opponent's--a building block for the revolution in military affairs. [4]

For all of these reasons, the Department of Defense is seeking a Family of Interoperable Operational Pictures (FIOP). [5] The department's multiservice approach to managing the Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP) represents a significant step forward. Rear Adm Michael G. Mathis, SIAP's system engineer, leads this effort. SLAP, fused from data inputs and fed from a variety of sensors and platforms, promises consistent, uninterrupted, and unique tracks for all airborne objects in the theater volume, forming a tactical air picture that everyone will share. Fully realizing this objective will not be easy, however. Operational shortfalls observed in exercises such as the Joint Air Defense Operations/Joint Engagement Zone and its successor, the All Service Combat Identification Evaluation Team (ASCIET), indicate the need for substantial improvement. [6] We must accommodate migration from our legacy systems--and budget constraints pose a challenge. But substantial progress is possible and will be made.

SIAP activity, motivated primarily by the urgent need--most notably by the Navy--for a more detailed, accurate, and timely tactical air picture to enable improvements in missile defense, is preceding serious attention to the other tactical pictures, such as the one that we will dub the Single Integrated Surface Picture (SISP). [7] One may reasonably ask why the Air Force--the service to which one might naturally look for anything pertaining to the aerospace realm--was not the driving force in pushing for an improved SIAP. This article explores the answers to that question and, in the process, considers arguments for two conjectures:

1. The Air Force's need for an improved SIAP is likely to increase in the future.

2. The Air Force should have a vital interest in the SISP.

The Navy Takes to the Air

The Air Force's primary air-superiority tool is the manned fighter--the F-15 and its successor, the F-22. One can summarize the Air Force's rationale for the current air-to-air operation of its fighters as follows: provide the fighters with a pretty good idea of where the enemy is, [8] allow the aircraft to establish themselves in the area of interest, and then let the onboard sensors and pilots figure out the enemy's exact location in order to execute the mission. [9] In other words, the main air-to-air weapon for the Air Force--the fighter and all it contains, including the pilot--is relatively error tolerant and, hence, autonomous. Moreover, recent air-to-air engagements generally allowed enough time for the human-in-the-loop autonomy to work. Because of the success of this autonomy, the Air Force has not given high priority to providing tighter coordination between its fighter weapon system and other systems. This autonomy, fundamental to Air Force culture, underlies the reason why the service was not a d riving force for SLAP improvements. [10]