Airpower and Restraint in Small Wars Marine Corps Aviation in the Second Nicaraguan Campaign, 1927-33

Aerospace Power Journal, Fall, 2001 by Dr. Wray R. Johnson

The Marine Corps had been dispatched to Nicaragua to aid the Conservative government of Adolfo Diaz and to protect Americans and their property from Liberal opposition forces led by Dr. Juan Sacasa. The Liberal army had disintegrated as a unified force but was replaced by small bands of guerrillas, the most prominent of which was led by Augusto C. Sandino. Although in rebellion against the government, Sandino also set about to rid the country of the American presence that had dominated it since the Taft administration. Waging a ruthless guerrilla war, Sandino presented the Marine Corps with an unprecedented challenge. Whereas in earlier conflicts in Central America and the Caribbean, the corps had faced nominally guerrilla formations ranging from organized criminals to politicized, disgruntled elements of society, in Nicaragua it faced a different kind of guerrilla opponent--one schooled and educated by Mexican Marxists and enjoying international support. The Marine Corps, therefore, was among the first regul ar forces in the twentieth century to face the "revolutionary guerrilla." Whereas in Haiti and the Dominican Republic the corps functioned as an occupation force, invoking martial law and having a free hand in the conduct of military operations in the field, in Nicaragua it supported the extant government and was thus constrained by political limitations that its predecessors in the Caribbean as well as British and French counterparts would have regarded as unthinkable.

Major Rowell in particular was sensitive to the limitations imposed on his operations, not the least of which was the impact of public opinion back home in the United States: "Public opinion, always to be respected, is sensitive to bloodshed and the newspapers are prone to publish rumors of scandals or abuses.... The practical effects... are numerous. For example: we may not bomb towns because it would not be consistent with a policy advocated at some international convention.... The safety of noncombatants becomes a matter of prime importance." [24]

It is important to note that Major Rowell's comments were offered in the context of a complaint: "We are required to conform to all of the rules of civilized warfare, while the enemy will torture prisoners, murder the wounded and mutilate the dead." Nevertheless, Major Rowell was bound by the restraints imposed upon him and at least grudgingly conceded to their political necessity. In a subsequent essay, he recounted how, in the earliest stages of the Marine Corps intervention, "the American mission was to stop the war--not to become involved in it." [25] This necessarily led to certain operational constraints. Major Rowell, therefore, "appealed to all pilots to avoid hostilities and to return fire only when necessary to save their own lives." [26]

But neutrality soon gave way to active combat operations as Sandino deliberately attacked Marine Corps patrols and garrisons as well as other Americans and their property. As the American role in Nicaragua became wider and deeper, operational constraints on the corps were loosened but never approximated the freedom its aviators enjoyed in the Caribbean--and certainly bore no similarity to the freedom of European air arms in their air-policing roles. For example, despite the fact that Major Rowell and other Marine Corps authors argued for the use of nonlethal chemicals such as tear gas (in contrast to the French use of lethal chemicals), US policy forbade such usage. [27]