Riding the Information-Revolution Tiger - development and implementation of military information technologies by Armed Forces

Aerospace Power Journal, Fall, 2001 by LOUIS E. McNAMARA JR.

LOUIS E. MCNAMARA JR. [*]

JOINT VISION 2010 (JV 2010) is the doctrinal framework inside which US forces will take advantage of new technologies to enhance their capabilities and develop new organizational structures.

Centered on achieving battlefield dominance across the spectrum of military operations, the four primary themes of JV 2010--dominat maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection--point the services in the same direction in terms of developing new capabilities. "The basis for this framework is found in the improved command, control, and intelligence which can be assured by information superiority." [1]

Information superiority allows military operations to be executed inside the enemy's decision cycle, effectively diminishing significant enemy resistance. Information superiority means we will have better knowledge of friendly and enemy forces and intentions than the opposition. Information superiority is at the core of future military innovation and modernization. If one achieves information superiority, JV 2010 postulates that it will provide dramatic advantages in command and control ([C.sup.2]) capabilities over our enemies.

However, the United States is in danger of not being able to realize the JV 2010 goal of developing a military force capable of being successful in unexpected circumstances across the full spectrum of military operations. The United States does not place a high enough priority on the development and procurement of [C.sup.2] assets. Specifically, the United States must accelerate the fielding of the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) and develop a [C.sup.2] system able to support dissemination of information between American and allied forces in order to have them in place by 2010.

This article addresses the potential benefits of [C.sup.2] in the information revolution and considers how to best ride this "information tiger." It defines C2 and explains the "revolution in military affairs" (RMA) and its implications for future [C.sup.2]. Lastly, the article considers the rewards and risks of the [C.sup.2] system postulated by JV 2010.

[C.sup.2] Defined

For the purposes of this article, the definition of [C.sup.2] given in Joint Publication (Joint Pub) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operation, will be used: "Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission." [2] Command is the authorized directing of people to accomplish the mission. Control is intrinsic to command--the process which "regulates forces and functions to execute the commander's intent." [3] [C.sup.2] is the process commanders employ to plan, direct, assess, coordinate, and control forces to accomplish the mission. The time frame for gathering information and acting on it is called the decision cycle. The decision cycle has three common parts--observing, deciding, and acting. The [C.sup.2] process focuses on the "deciding" portion within the decision cycle.

Revolution in Military Affairs

JV 2010 sets the stage for one of the most influential events shaping current military needs--the RMA. Today many believe a RMA caused by significant advances in information technology is in progress. [4] However, for a true revolution in military affairs to occur, the military needs not only to incorporate the technology but change its operational structure too. Technological advances occurring today will impact the way future war is conducted, and the ideas presented in JV 2010 are designed to be the foundation for the military's efforts to take advantage of this technology.

The greatest military changes resulting from the technological revolution in military affairs should be organizational and doctrinal, as the networking of forces permits dispersed integrated operations. Our ability to globally link command, control, and communications ([C.sup.3]) systems with surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence assets will become the governing factor in determining US war-fighting capability. Smaller dispersed and synchronous forces operating with better situational awareness than their adversary's forces are the military's vision. For example, during Operation Desert Fox (1998 air attacks on Iraq by US and British forces--main weapons used were Tomahawks, B-52s, and Tornados) information technology enabled the Air Force and Navy to coordinate operations through an interoperable [C.sup.2] structure. This allowed the services to coordinate a strike package that executed near-simultaneous missile attacks against over 50 targets in Iraq.

Despite the tremendous potential of the current RMA, there are associated issues that need to be explored. The first of two issues considered is the diffusion of key RMA technologies such as space systems, computer architecture, telecommunication systems, and global-information distribution networks. [5] Specifically, how fast and to what extent will the technological advantages be diffused to other nations? This is very difficult, if not impossible, to determine, but some deductions can be made based on available information: (1) many RMA technologies are products of the civilian market, making some degree of diffusion a probability; (2) since the military is becoming increasingly rooted in dual-use technologies, the rate of diffusion could potentially be rapid; and (3) if a key technology is diffused, it may not yield much in the way of a comparative advantage during war.