Riding the Information-Revolution Tiger - development and implementation of military information technologies by Armed Forces

Aerospace Power Journal, Fall, 2001 by LOUIS E. McNAMARA JR.

Although the interoperability of [C.sup.2] hardware is important for successful joint and coalition operations, it is not the only element necessary for success. The full potential of information technology cannot be achieved without supporting doctrinal and organizational changes. [C.sup.2] is often based on the tenets of centralized control and decentralized execution. This is consistent with [C.sup.2]'s current hierarchical organizational approach. However, exploiting new technology may require a decentralization of command authority so opportunities are not missed.

Examples of poor interoperability illustrating this point can be found in the Leyte Gulf Operation conducted during World War II. Adm Thomas C. Kinkaid and Adm William F. Halsey Jr. lost an opportunity to destroy the Japanese Central and Northern Forces because of the hierarchical [C.sup.2] structure they were working in. Kinkaid assumed Halsey was guarding San Bernardino Strait, protecting amphibious shipping; however, Halsey had taken his forces north in pursuit of the Japanese Northern Forces because he viewed his primary mission as offensive, not defensive. The result was that elements of the Japanese Central and Northern Forces were able to escape. If Halsey and Kinkaid had been better able to "self-synchronize" their efforts by using a globally netted, flatter [C.sup.2] system, the results may have been different.

Flatter organizational structures that delegate authority and utilize the tenets of centralized control and decentralized execution would create a more dynamic organization able to quickly respond to change. For example "the flight deck of an aircraft carrier provides an excellent, although small-scale, representation of a decentralized flexible organization." [11] It has a well-trained crew; it is a responsive, flat organization; and relevant, necessary information is widely distributed. "The flight deck operates on the basis of simple decision rules, with authority for action placed at the action levels, dependent upon position, skill, and information." [12] For example, the joint force commander could organize his/her [C.sup.2] structure in a similar manner by employing a well-trained smaller staff, guided by commander's intent, working in an environment where relevant information is widely distributed--a decentralized, flexible [C.sup.2] structure.

Additionally, the commander's intent becomes critical when one decentralizes execution. If a subordinate knows what the commander intends to do, the appropriate decision can be made in the commander's absence--or in the absence of further guidance from the commander. The increases in the availability of high-quality information achieved through information superiority should help subordinates make these decisions. The Navy is an example of a task-oriented organization utilizing commander's intent to imply "command by negation." Command by negation is based on a common understanding of the objective to be achieved. It has the advantage of shorter reaction times because subordinates do not have to constantly ask for permission to act. If the decision is not overruled, it is approved. During World War II, the Germans used the concept of Auftragstaktik, which provided a great deal of freedom of action to subordinate commanders. The German system told subordinate commanders what they were supposed to do and relied on their initiative to accomplish it. The point being illustrated by these examples is that "speed of action can only be adhieved through a process that decentralizes decision making and delegates authority." [13]