The Myth of Air Control Reassessing the History

Aerospace Power Journal, Winter, 2000 by Dr. James S. Corum

The government's announcement that it had withdrawn all British forces from Iraq was technically correct. However, it made little mention of the fact that Indian army brigades and supporting troops had replaced them. Since the Indian State military budget rather than the British War Department budget paid for the Indian army troops, British taxpayers and politicians got a pretty good deal--the only player unhappy with the arrangement was the government of India. [20] Although Iraq became an example of a country garrisoned by airpower, a significant army force remained on hand throughout the entire period of the British mandate until Iraq received full independence in 1932. By 1926 the British had created the framework of an Iraqi army, which boasted a military college, training center, and cavalry school--and the regular army had grown to a force of six infantry battalions, four cavalry regiments, four artillery batteries, and various supporting units. [21] The British also maintained at least a brigade of I ndian army troops in the country until the 1930s.

Air-Control Policy

The British Empire had long relied upon punitive expeditions to bring rebellious natives back into line. When a border tribe on India's Northwest Frontier violated a treaty or when a band in Aden took a British official hostage, the standard response called for putting together a military expedition, marching on the tribal center, burning some villages, destroying crops, and killing any tribesmen who offered resistance. Then the army column would return to the garrison, knowing that the natives had been taught a lesson and would not likely defy British power again. The lesson and deterrent effect would last for a short time--sometimes months, sometimes years--and then the tribesmen would commit another outrage, necessitating another British expedition to punish them. [22] Punitive expeditions ranged in size from a platoon of the Camel Corps riding against one village to months-long operations mounted on the Northwest Frontier by thousands of soldiers. A comprehensive list of punitive expeditions mounted by B ritain at the height of the empire--between 1840 and 1940, from Burma to India to the Sudan--would certainly number in the hundreds, probably in the thousands. In short, such expeditions were brutal but indispensable means of keeping the empire under control.

To put it simply, air control meant substituting aerial bombardment for the traditional ground-based punitive expedition. Airplanes could reach the object of the expedition (e.g., the tribal headquarters or main village) very quickly. Airplanes had an impressive amount of firepower and the capability to inflict serious harm upon rebellious natives. Since disruption and destruction were the goal of a punitive expedition, a small force of airplanes proved cheaper and more efficient since it could inflict as much damage as a large and cumbersome ground-force expedition.

The early RAF statements on air control stress its effectiveness and lethality. In the spirit of the empire, everyone acknowledged that strong and forceful action was the best means of keeping natives under control. As pointed out by RAF wing commander J. A. Chamier in 1921,