The Myth of Air Control Reassessing the History

Aerospace Power Journal, Winter, 2000 by Dr. James S. Corum

To establish a tradition, therefore, which will prove effective, if only a threat of what is to follow afterwards is displayed, the Air Force must, if called upon to administer punishment, do it with all its might and in the proper manner. One objective must be selected--preferably the most inaccessible village of the most prominent tribe which it is desired to punish. All available aircraft must be collected.... The attack with bombs and machine guns must be relentless and unremitting and carried on continuously by day and night, on houses, inhabitants, crops and cattle.... This sounds brutal, I know, but it must be made brutal to start with. The threat alone in the future will prove efficacious if the lesson is once properly learnt. [23]

The draft of the RAF's Notes on the Method of Employment of the Air Arm in Iraq proudly pointed out that "within 45 minutes a fullsized village... can be practically wiped out and a third of its inhabitants killed or injured by four or five planes which offer them no real target and no opportunity for glory or avarice." [24] Although such tactics expressed the common military view on how the empire needed to be policed against the rebellious tribes and bandits that threatened good order, such policies came under increasing attack in parliament during the 1920s. The RAF had to defend itself against the charge of inhumane warfare when a Labour government came to power in 1924. That year, Colonial Secretary James Thomas wrote to the high commissioner in Iraq and complained that critical press stories had appeared about bombing rebellious tribesmen and that heavy casualties "will not be easily explained or defended in Parliament by me." [25] In order to make air control more palatable to the politicians, later d rafts of the RAF's notes on air control stressed its humanitarian aspects. Rebellious villages would first receive a warning that they would be bombed if they did not accede to government demands. After allowing a reasonable time for evacuation, aircraft would demolish the houses with bombs-not with the intention of destroying the village but with the aim of disrupting daily life. [26]

The War Ministry, which resisted the idea of the RAF's controlling military operations in any colony, also chimed in about the inhumanity of bombing women and children. [27] The argument, however, fails flat when one considers that army punitive expeditions routinely burned the crops and food stores of rebellious tribes and fired artillery into villages. [28] In fact, most of the army officers in the colonies heartily approved of immediate and forceful action by the RAF as a means of keeping incipient native rebellions in check. After the massacre of 1919, when army troops under Gen Reginald Dyer killed four hundred unarmed civilians at a protest meeting at Amritsar, India, the armed forces policing the empire were directed to operate under the doctrine of "minimum necessary force." The RAF learned to report the casualties of air control in vague terms, and enthusiastic supporters of the policy, such as Basil Liddell Hart, argued that prompt action by the air force at the first sign of trouble had calmed "tr ibal insubordination ... before it could grow dangerous and there has been an immense saving of blood and treasure to the British and Iraqi governments." [29]