Thinking about China and War

Aerospace Power Journal, Winter, 2001 by Jeffrey Dr. Record

The Korean War stands as a case study in miscalculation by both Washington and Beijing, notwithstanding repeated attempts by both sides to signal intentions to each other. The United States grossly underestimated China's willingness and ability to defend its strategic interests in Korea; indeed, the Truman administration had difficulty accepting the very presence of such interests. Max Hastings observes that because the "United States was convinced that its policies...presented no threat to any legitimate Chinese interest[,] Washington therefore persuaded itself that Peking would reach the same conclusion." (20) As MacArthur's forces crossed the 38th parallel and advanced toward the Yalu, the administration believed it sufficient simply to declare that it had no designs on Chinese territory; it apparently never occurred to President Truman or Secretary of State Dean Acheson that Beijing might regard the establishment of a reunified, anticommunist Korea adjacent to China's industrial heartland as a strategic t hreat. (After all, had not the Japanese used Korea as a jumping-off point for their conquest of Manchuria?) This lack of imagination contributed in turn to the administration's virtual deafness to Beijing's numerous warnings that it was prepared to enter the war rather than accept an American client state along the Yalu. Even when first contact was made with Chinese forces, the administration refused to believe that it represented anything more than political posturing, a token intervention. (21)

The administration's incomprehension of China's motives--specifically, its failure to grasp that country's strength of interest in Korea--was attended by disdain for China's military capacity. MacArthur and the rest of the American military had nothing but contempt for Chinese fighting power; indeed, MacArthur assured Truman that he would make short work of the Chinese if they tried to intervene. At his meeting with Truman on Wake Island, he said there was "very little" chance of Chinese intervention. "They have no air force. Now that we have bases for our Air Force in Korea, if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang, there would be the greatest slaughter." (22) From an American perspective, an army of simple peasants armed with bolt-action rifles and lacking air cover was no match for US forces, and if this fact was self-evident to the Americans, then obviously it would also be to the Chinese. MacArthur's pet corps commander, Gen Edward Almond, exhorted his Yalu-bound troops, "Don't let a bunch of Chines e laundrymen stop you." (23) There was no appreciation of the strengths of the PLA--its superb discipline, tenacity, and capacity to endure hardship--or the degree to which terrain in northern Korea could be exploited by guerrilla tactics at the expense of a conventional, roadbound army.

Yet, if the Americans miscalculated in Korea, so did the Chinese leadership. Mao Zedong not only believed that Chinese intervention was imperative, he also believed that the PLA could sweep the Americans off the peninsula--a conviction strengthened after the PLA routed the Americans along the Yalu. (24) If the Americans placed excessive faith in material superiority, Mao believed that human factors--superior will, discipline, and fighting skills--and, above all, a superior cause could defeat firepower-rich US forces. He regarded US troops as roadbound, creature-comforted softies who were fighting for the evil cause of imperialism--and, therefore, were incapable of mustering the capacity for sacrifice characteristic of seasoned PTA forces. (25)