Airpower versus a fielded army: A construct for air operations in the twenty-first century

Aerospace Power Journal, Winter, 2001 by Phil M. Lt Col Haun

Editorial Abstract: Most readers are familiar with Col John Warden five-ring theory and the reticence of Air Force commanders to use aerospace power to attack fielded ground forces. However, political realities will likely dictate that we do so in future, as evidenced by Operation Allied Force. Colonel Haun feels that we must learn from Kosovo and prepare to support an air-first strategy. The services need to organize, train, and equip for such operations, especially in the areas of target location, identification, and battle damage assessment.

SINCE OPERATION DESERT Storm, Air Force strategic planners have been enamored with Col John Warden's five concentric rings and the underlying assumption that enemy military forces are of limited importance compared to enemy leadership. However, Warden's attractive paradigm reduces airpower's flexibility when a de-emphasis on attacking military forces serves to atrophy the Air Force's ability to strike ground forces. The joint force air component commander (JFACC) is tasked with attacking centers of gravity identified by the objectives of the National Command Authorities (NCA) and the joint force commander. Recent shifts in policy and strategy have favored airpower as the military instrument of choice to attack not only traditional strategic targets but also fielded forces, independent of friendly ground operations. As air operations in both Bosnia and Kosovo illustrate, political leaders are seeking to coerce opponents by ordering direct attacks on fielded forces, conducted primarily--if not solely--by airpower.

Although people still debate over whether such attacks represent the most effective use of airpower, events over the last decade have made this strategy a reality. During that time, America's leaders have directed the Air Force to attack an enemy's fielded forces, so our service should prepare itself to do so again when the next call comes. Valuable lessons from the experience in Operation Allied Force point to a new, systemic, operational, and tactical framework for more efficiently conducting air operations against fielded forces.

Operation Allied Force: Attacking the Serbian Third Army

For anyone who believed that one could attack fielded forces only on a flat, open desert, Allied Force demonstrated otherwise. During that operation, a combination of context, policy, and overall military strategy compelled airmen to apply airpower in direct attack of a fielded army. The much-publicized caveat that the Serbian army would face no threat from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ground forces further complicated the situation. (1)

Planning for possible air operations against Serbia began in earnest in May 1998. By July, Gen Wesley Clark, supreme allied commander Europe, was focusing NATO's military actions around a phased air operation. (2) However, during negotiations at Rambouillet, France, General Clark ordered the Air Force's combined force air component commander, Lt Gen Michael Short, to increase the scope of planned attacks from punitive strikes against fixed targets to attacks on the Serbian Third Army deployed in Kosovo (fig. 1), even though General Short was not convinced that direct attacks constituted the best use of airpower. (3) However, NATO drove the planning, and its stated military objectives included two that dealt directly with the Serbian fielded forces: deterring further Serbian action against the Kosovar Albanians and reducing the ability of the Serbian military to continue offensive operations against them. (4)

This was no easy task! Concealed within the verdant, cloud-covered valley of Kosovo roamed 40,000 soldiers of the Serbian Third Army equipped with hundreds of tanks, armored personnel carriers (APC), and artillery pieces--interspersed with over a million Kosovar Albanians. In addition, a wall of mobile, radar-guided surface-to-air missiles; man-portable missiles; and antiaircraft pieces, as well as a squadron of MiG-21 fighters, protected Third Army from NATO air forces. (5)

In developing plans to use against the Serbian Third Army, US air planners relied on suppression of enemy air defenses and electronic jamming assets to confuse and degrade the Serbs' integrated air defense system. But after strike aircraft could safely enter Kosovo, two tactical problems remained: how to locate and identify the targets and how to successfully attack them while limiting collateral damage. A-10 and F-16CG (Block 40) forward air controllers airborne (FACA) trained in visual reconnaissance and air-strike control would identify targets and limit collateral damage. (6) FACAs would search out targets identified either from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets during premission planning or real time from joint surveillance, target attack radar system (JSTARS) aircraft. After the targets were identified, the FACAs would control strikes, using available NATO aircraft.

Air attacks against targets in Serbia and Kosovo were conducted under strict rules of engagement (ROE), part of which included an above-ground-level altitude restriction of 15,000 feet (later lowered to 10,000 feet for FACAs) to protect NATO aircraft from hostile ground fire. (7) As Allied Force progressed, the ROE underwent continual adjustment to restrict the types of targets for attack. By early June, FACAs had to receive permission from the combined air operations center (CAOC) for any targets attacked.