Unity without unification: the development of Nigeria's 'inside-out' approach to African political integration, 1937-1963

International Social Science Review, Spring-Summer, 2007 by Ehimika A. Ifidon

Addressing a seminar on the African Union (formerly the Organization of African Unity) held at Abuja, Nigeria, in mid-May 2001, Olusegun Obasanjo, the president of Nigeria, expressed much optimism regarding the potential of the organization. Specifically, he suggested that its design benefited from an analysis of the failures of the integration process in Africa. African states, according to Obasanjo, had failed to integrate primarily due to a lack of political will of their governments "to subordinate domestic political and economic interests to supranational institutions with long-term regional goals." (1) More importantly, Obasanjo stated that "the African Union is the final goal of African Unity that African leaders have been pursuing for more than 40 years." He then told Nigerians that the "management of their political, social and economic affairs [would] be integrated into those of the African continent." Nigeria, he declared, had not only shared this Pan-African vision, it had always worked toward its achievement. (2)

Neither of the latter two assertions is beyond question. Regarding the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Obasanjo's declaration that the African Union represents the culmination of a consensual quest that is more than four decades old is an exaggerated claim? Moreover, considering the tenor of Nigeria's African policy since gaining its independence, such a role for Nigeria would have been revolutionary. Such claims raise several questions: Which Nigerian leaders should be included amongst those African leaders who pursued the goal of union for over four decades? Which Nigeria has always shared this vision of union? Both questions give rise to a third query: What has been Nigeria's attitude toward surrendering its sovereignty?

This paper focuses on the nature and sources of Nigeria's attitude toward African political integration before the founding of the OAU (1963). In so doing, it examines the emergence of the discourse on Nigerian identity during the quarter century that preceded the establishment of the OAU. It argues that the domination of the emerging Nigerian political scene in the 1920s and 1930s by non-Nigerian Africans, efforts to undo that trend, and a growing awareness of Nigeria's material wealth produced a strong sense of national identity and power. At the same time, it fostered a tendency toward isolationism which precluded absorbing or dominating, as well as being absorbed or dominated by other states. This 'inside-out' or country-first approach toward African political association represented an ideological compromise between Nigeria's need to retain its identity and sovereignty, and the necessity of participating in international affairs. That compromise found expression in the concept of 'unity without unification.'

The Realist Identity of the OAU

Before 1963, two antagonistic political and ideological alliances, the Casablanca and Monrovia blocs, dominated interstate politics in Africa. These groups essentially differed over what type of political association independent African states should form. The Casablanca bloc, composed of radical states (e.g., Morocco, Ghana, and Guinea), wanted a political union or fusion of African states; the Monrovia bloc, a group of moderate to conservative pro-western states (e.g., Liberia, Nigeria, and Senegal), merely sought functional, or non-political cooperation (i.e., transportation, communication, and education) among African states? As political scientist Zdenek Cervenka explains, "the Casablanca group was convinced that political unity was a prerequisite for the subsequent integration of African economies, while the Monrovia group maintained that African unity should be approached through economic cooperation only." (5) The OAU thus represented "a compromise between [these] radically differing views of African unity." (6) As such, it is viewed as "a largely negative agreement--not to move too much to the left nor too far to the right." (7) Does it not follow then that the OAU, like all compromises, would prove to be ineffective and lack both stability and identity?

This generally accepted view regarding the establishment of the OAU is flawed. Such a perspective substitutes the views of particular states and their leaders for the positions of the Casablanca and Monrovia groups. Apart from statements of affirmation of the Casablanca group to "preserve and consolidate our identity of view and unity of action in international affairs," and the goal of its African Political Committee to coordinate and unify "the general policy of the various African States," there is nothing in the African Charter of Casablanca (1961) which suggests that its members wanted a political union of African states. (8) Furthermore, as journalist Colin Legum points out, "although Dr. [Kwame] Nkrumah [, the first president of Ghana and one of the founders of Pan-Africanism] argued strongly at the Casablanca Conference for political union, his proposal was not accepted." (39)