Brams, Steven J. Negotiation Games: Applying Game Theory to Bargaining and Arbitration

International Social Science Review, Fall-Winter, 2003 by Samuel B. Hoff

New York: Routledge, 2003. xxvi + 297 pp. Hardcover, $120.00. Paperback, $33.95

In this revised edition of his 1990 book, New York University Professor of Politics Steven Brams applies game theory concepts to a plethora of situations. According to the author, negotiation and bargaining "are critical to coping with all manner of strategic problems that arise in dealings people have with each other and with organizations. Not only does game theory offer important insights into why this is the case, but it also shows how some of these problems can be ameliorated if not solved" (p. xviii). The text is intended for persons in academics, international business, and diplomacy, among other fields.

The initial chapter begins with a discussion of negotiations found in the Bible. These include three stories of note: (1) Cain's murder of Abel and his bargaining with God over punishment; (2) Rahab's negotiation with Israelite spies in Jericho; and, (3) Solomon's arbitration of a dispute between two women who claimed motherhood of a baby. All of the parables have an element of deception, demonstrating that "advanced bargaining skills may go hand in hand with questionable ethics" (p. 26). Here Brams introduces the reader to two valuable tools used by rational choice, including the game tree and the outcome matrix.

The next two chapters distinguish between an appraiser and an arbitrator as a third party in bargaining. To illustrate the former, Brams studies President Jimmy Carter's brokering of the 1978 Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt. Though considered an honest negotiator, Carter's success in getting the two principals to agree to terms also benefited the United States. Regarding the latter, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, whose shuttle diplomacy on behalf of the Nixon administration in 1973 helped bring peace after the Yom Kippur War, served as both a mediator and arbitrator. Various forms of arbitration are discussed, such as conventional, final-offer, and combined forms.

Two forms of 2 x 2 games, Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken, are applied to international crises involving the United States and the Soviet Union. In the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the stakes are conceived as a game of chicken. The options included compromise, advantage to one side, and disaster. In this instance, the withdrawal of missiles placed in Cuba by the Soviets signified a clear victory for the United States. On the other hand, President Richard M. Nixon's 1973 warning to the Soviets not to enter the Yom Kippur War on the side of Arab states is best represented by the Prisoner's Dilemma, where the results encompass compromise, advantage to one side, and conflict. Because both sides remained on the sidelines in the latter instance, compromise was the outcome. The possession of nuclear weapons by the United States and Soviet Union, however, leads one to question whether a military conflict between the superpowers could end in anything short of Armageddon.

The author then turns to examples where threats between two players may benefit both sides--albeit temporarily--and, alternatively, where a threat may backfire, hurting both participants. To demonstrate the first scenario above, Brams employs the 1980-81 standoff between the Solidarity labor movement and the Communist party government in Poland. Following several gains by the fledging union, the government declared martial law and jailed many Solidarity leaders. Ironically, the downturn of the economy eight years later hastened the decline of communism in Poland and Eastern Europe as a whole. In the Watergate scandal, President Nixon initially refused to turn over the tapes of White House conversations, several of which implicated him in a cover-up of the burglary at the Democratic National Committee's office. The unanimous ruling of the U. S. Supreme Court against Nixon's claim of absolute executive privilege led to his resignation under threat of impeachment.

The ensuing two chapters examine bargaining in the legislative-branch setting and between branches of government. Vote trading in the U.S. Congress and coalition formation in parliamentary democracies are offered as examples of legislative bargaining. The veto power of the president, as contrasted with the authority of Congress to override it, forms the basis for an assessment of the power quotient between the branches, something Brams seeks to measure using a combination of formulas.

In the Epilogue, Brams summarizes the major themes of bargaining presented in the text. He observes that, although the utilization of game theory does not lend itself to easy solutions, "it provides a deductive logic for understanding the conditions that facilitate or impede negotiation" (p. 265).

The current text may be compared to three recent books on the subject of game theory and its applications. Roger Myerson's Game Theory (1997) furnishes a general introduction to the topic. Howard Raiffa's Negotiation Analysis (2002) applies game theory to political parties. James Miller's Game Theory at Work (2003) attempts to fit game theory to divergent areas, including Greek mythology, sports and lotteries, the personal-computer industry, and prices and stocks.