Point: the case for profiling

International Social Science Review, Fall-Winter, 2004 by Sharon R. Reddick

On September 11, 2001 ("9/11"), over 3,000 lives were lost in New York City, Washington, D.C., and Somerset County, Pennsylvania, due, in part, to ineffective airport security. Since that horrific day, air travel has become increasingly unpleasant without necessarily being safer. Profiling, based on both the behavior and appearance of airline passengers, provides a vital tool that effectively and efficiently increases airport security. Before 9/11, racial profiling was a term that most often referred to a "law enforcement practice of taking the race of a potential suspect into account in deciding whether to initiate investigation of that suspect." (1) Before the tragic events of that day, eighty percent of Americans opposed racial profiling. (2) Today, sixty percent of Americans believe in the necessity of some form of profiling to ensure public safety and national security. (3) The threat of terrorism on American soil perpetrated by fanatic Muslim extremists makes profiling necessary for the security of the United States. Clearly, the U.S. is now engaged in a war against terrorism. Historically, in times of national emergencies, profiling becomes a weapon to combat and monitor America's enemies. Now, more than ever, every weapon available must be utilized to combat terrorists who do not value their own lives or the lives of innocent noncombatants.

Throughout its history, the United States has employed some form of profiling to restrict the activities of its enemies. During World War I, the Sedition Act of 19l8--an amendment to the Espionage Act enacted a year earlier to outlaw spying and subversive activities by foreign enemies--required "enemy aliens" to register in each state. Pursuant to the Enemy Alien Act of 1798, an enemy alien (or alien enemy) was defined as a person above the age of fourteen, born in a country at war with America, then residing in the United States but not a naturalized citizen? During World War II, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Korematsu v. United States (1944), affirmed Executive Order 9066 authorizing the creation of military areas from which individuals might be excluded to prevent espionage or sabotage. In the opinion of Associate Justice Hugo Black:

   All legal restrictions, which curtail the civil rights of a single
   racial group, are immediately suspected. That is not to say that
   such restrictions are unconstitutional.... To cast this case into
   outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military
   dangers which were present, merely confuses the issue?

These restrictions on the civil rights of German-Americans and Japanese-Americans, respectively, were defensive measures based on wartime exigencies, not national origin or race. Today, while the United States is not at war with any particular Arab nation, the majority of terrorists come from Arab countries, are between the ages of seventeen and forty, and they are Muslim extremists.

The greatest barrier to profiling is the fear that Americans have of offending anyone. To appease civil liberties groups like the American Civil Liberties Union, airport security officials have foregone profiling in favor of random inspections. This system is impractical, frustrating, and ineffective. Random selection allows a young Arabic-looking man to walk through security while a ninety-year-old great-great-grandmother from Arizona is virtually strip-searched. Good manners and respect for everyone will not provide protection against terrorism.

Evidence suggests that the events of 9/11 could have been avoided had the Federal Bureau of Investigation been allowed to continue its line of scientific profiling that led to the arrest of the so-called "twentieth hijacker," Zacarias Moussaoui, a month before 9/11. (6) The science of profiling was developed from the processes of narrowing a list of suspects by identifying areas of interaction of numerous generalizations belonging to all suspects. Profiling, which relies solely on race, ethnicity, religion, or national origin in selecting which individuals to subject to routine or spontaneous investigatory activities, is inappropriate. Probable cause to target a specific individual is different than profiling based on race. Scientific profiling utilizes mathematical probabilities without relying on race as a major factor in the analysis. (7)

Many agencies and businesses use some form of profiling for a variety of reasons. Airlines which operate in the United States rely on CAPPS II (Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening, Second Generation), a database system that gathers information gleaned from airline artificial intelligence and other powerful software to analyze passengers' travel reservations, housing information, family ties, credit report information, and other personal data. The CAPPS II system is used to determine whether a passenger is a selectee or non-selectee for heightened security checks. The Federal Aviation Administration insists that, while CAPPS II does not target any group based on race, national origin, or religion, it will be able to greatly reduce the possibility of hijacking. (8) Secretary of Transportation Norman Y. Mineta describes CAPPS II as "the foundation on which all other far more public security measures really depend." (9)