Nullifying the Effectiveness of Weapons of Mass Destruction —with Integrated Land-, Air-, and Space-Based Sensors and Analysis - NBC - military policy, United States

CML Army Chemical Review, July, 2000 by William E. King IV

"Weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, biological, and chemical, along with their associated delivery systems, pose a major threat to our security and that of our allies and other friendly nations. Thus, a key part of our National Security Strategy is to seek to stem the proliferation of such weapons and to develop an effective capability to deal with these threats." [1]

The National Security Strategy, 1998

Despite the best combined efforts of the world's five major powers (United States, China, Great Britain, Russia, and France), Third World countries, rogue radical groups, and potential terrorist organizations continue their alarming proliferation of weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) technologies. According to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the proliferation of WMD is "the most overriding security interest of our time." [2] Supporting her statement, in recent testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee, the directors of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency agreed that the proliferation of WMD is the biggest threat to national security. LTG Patrick M. Hughes, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, explained "because chemical and biological weapons are generally easier to develop, hide, and employ than nuclear weapons," they will be "more widely proliferated and have a higher probability of being used over the next two decades." [3]

This article presents a concept for a near-future application of an integrated land-, air-, and space-based system of sensors, detectors, and analysis to provide critical immediate warning, reporting, and situational updates of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) attacks. It shows how much more efficient and effective this concept could be compared to the United States' current system of independent detectors and sensors operating separately at the various levels of command and control. Ultimately, this article describes a concept that has a greater potential to achieve the United States' objective of convincing potential enemies that NBC weapons will be ineffective. Its underlying assumption is that when the United States and its coalition partners develop the capability to deny or limit the effects of an enemy NBC attack and can promise a devastatingly disproportional retaliation, then enemy WMD will be ineffective and the threat of its use will proportionately decline.

The five major world powers created and spearheaded international agreements with the intent of controlling the spread of WMD including the material, equipment, and technologies used in making them. Although the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, SALT treaties, Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention encapsulate the best intentions of their creators, enforcing them has proven difficult, if not impossible. The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee concedes that export control agreements "can only slow the spread of WMD technology." [4]

Nations and private companies have violated the treaties with the knowledge that they cannot be enforced. Exporters, motivated by extremely high profits with very little associated risk, endeavor to evade economic sanctions. However, covert smuggling often is not necessary. That is especially true of the materials, equipment, and technologies that are widely available commercially. Many of the technologies associated with the development of NBC weapons, especially chemical and biological, are classified as dual-use compounds because they also have legitimate civil applications. These technologies, relatively easy to obtain and convert into weapons, are very attractive to terrorist groups who want the power of WMD without the expense. According to Ashton Carter, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, "export controls alone cannot prevent proliferation," because determined leaders like Saddam Hussein can "home grow their WMD or get them from other countries." [5]

As the proliferation and availability of WMD continue to expand, so do the threats and the expectation of their use. Aggressive Third World countries and rogue radical groups cannot compete directly with the superpowers. The resources required for supporting a large military force, or even conducting research and development for innovative weapons systems, are beyond their capabilities. Thus, as they compete for strategic positioning, power, and international recognition, they use the most destructive devices already within their grasp. Even the weakest terrorist group believes that large numbers of casualties and the ensuing panic inflicted by their insidious assaults will promote their political objectives.

The United States cannot stand by idly while such danger grows. The only way this emerging threat can be contained is by a clear and forceful U.S. policy that will lead the international community in a concerted effort to prevent; deter; and, if necessary, respond to acquisition, threats, and prospective use of WMD. [6]