Combat service and logistic support in the Vistula-Oder strategic offensive operation

Military Thought, Jan-March, 2005 by V.I. Filonov, M.A. Vilinov

The Vistula-Oder Operation, conducted by troops of the First Belorussian and the First Ukrainian fronts in the period from January 12 until February 3, 1945, was one of the largest strategic offensive operations at the final stage of the third period of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Its success was facilitated by vigorous actions by armies on the left wing of the Second Belorussian Front and the right wing of the Fourth Ukrainian Front. In the course of the operation, Soviet troops routed a strong enemy grouping covering the Berlin axis of advance, accomplished a strategic breakthrough of enemy defenses and, pushing the pursuit to a depth of 600 kilometers, reached the distant approaches to Berlin. (1)

Strikes against the adversary were planned throughout the extent of the Soviet-German front with the main efforts concentrated on the Warsaw-Berlin salient. Here, by early 1945, troops of the First Belorussian Front (commander Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov) and the First Ukrainian Front (commander MSU I.S. Konev) had reached the line of the Vistula River, holding three bridge-heads on its western bank: Magnuszew (45 kilometers along the front and 18 kilometers in depth), Pulawy (up to 30 kilometers and 10 kilometers, respectively), and Sandomierz (70 kilometers and 50 kilometers, respectively). They were confronted with the main forces of the Nazi Army Group A, based on the 300 km to 500 km deep defense line on the Vistula. The Nazi command authorities, erroneously believing that the Red Army was going to deliver the main strikes in Hungary and Eastern Prussia, concentrated their main forces on the flanks of the Soviet-German Front. That made it possible to ensure a considerable superiority over the adversary at the center of the front: 3.9 times in personnel (2,203,700 and 560,000 servicemen, respectively), 6.7 times in artillery (33,500 and about 5,000 guns, respectively), 5.7 times in tanks and self-propelled artillery systems (more than 7,000 and 1,220, respectively), and 6.8 times in combat aircraft (5,000 and 730 times, respectively). (2)

The Soviet war economy at the second half of 1944-early 1945 enabled the supreme commander to create such large groupings of forces and conduct large scale offensive operations, while allowing the rear services to provide all round support in complex combat conditions. Table 1 gives some quantitative indicators of the production of basic types of weapons, combat hardware, equipment, and ammunition in 1944. (3)

The Table shows graphically that in the second half of 1944 (shortly before the launch of the Vistula-Oder Operation), the main efforts of the Soviet war industry were focused on the production of large caliber artillery guns (from 76 mm and higher), tanks and self propelled artillery guns (mainly medium and heavy types), and combat aviation--that is to say, the most powerful and effective weapon systems and combat assets to engage the adversary in combat and in the operation as a whole.

By the second half of 1944, traffic on all of the country's principal modes of transport increased substantially. Table 2 shows that its growth was ensured above all with railway shipments. At the same time, the share of the air transport component began to increase. In January 1945, compared to December 1944--that is to say, during the period of the most intensive preparations for the Vistula-Oder operation and at the beginning of the operation--loading on railways increased by 971 rail cars per day and unloading by 589 cars a days. (4)

The growing numerical strength of troops, especially in the regular army, as well as the highly mobile, maneuverable and dynamic character of combat action substantially increased their needs for material and technical supplies. Thus, whereas in 1943, Soviet troops consumed 3,261,000 tonnes of fuel and lubricants and 4,417,700 tonnes of bread and baked products, in 1944, the numbers increased to 3,846,000 tonnes and 5,468,000 tonnes, respectively, with 55,000 more rail carfuls of ammunition sent to the fronts.

The condition of the country's economy in 1944 helped considerably increase the rear services' logistic capabilities. Thus, whereas in early 1943, the railway troops had a total numerical strength of 196,000 servicemen, in late 1944, it reached 253,000 (5) with railway operation and maintenance brigades beginning to be formed, each structurally organized with three operation and maintenance regiments. In early 1945, based on brigade command and control centers, military operation and maintenance front directorates were deployed: They were designed to direct the operation of railways beyond Soviet borders.

The numerical strength of the road troops was also growing. By the beginning of the Vistula-Oder Operation, it was approximately 240,000 servicemen. By January 1945, the road troops numbered more than 600 units and agencies of all kinds.

Motor units were also being strengthened. Whereas as of January 1, 1943, the T/O strength of motor transport units was 67,125 personnel with 35,234 motor vehicles, in early 1944, the figures increased to 164,733 and 78,733, respectively. (6)